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Abstract  
 
We analyze the deficits of the German Länder (regional states) for the period from 1960 to 
2005 and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy of 
public deficits. Estimating a dynamic panel data model, we find evidence for an opportunistic 
political business cycle: German voters seem to favor fiscal discipline as debt issue is 
significantly lower in pre-election years. Coalition governments with a weak finance minister 
issue significantly more debt than single-party governments while there is no difference in 
borrowing between single-party governments and coalitions with a strong finance minister. 
There is no evidence for partisan behavior; so, party ideology seems to play a negligible role.   
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1. Introduction 
Public deficits vary widely between jurisdictions. It is broadly accepted that economic 
variables such as economic growth or the interest rate alone cannot explain these differences. 
In fact, political variables and political institutions play an important role in the development 
of public debt (Persson and Tabellini, 1997). When comparing different countries, however, 
one can hardly disentangle the effect of political variables and the impact of political 
institutions. This identification problem disappears when the influence of political variables 
on public debt in the German states (Länder) is analyzed as the jurisdictions have almost 
identical political institutions and electoral rules. However, they differ quite substantially in 
other dimensions such as fiscal policy outcomes and per capita income. Thus, our data set 
offers a promising opportunity to solely test for the influence of political variables on public 
deficits.  
We test a number of hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature on the political economy 
of debt issue. The empirical literature on opportunistic behavior, where political behavior is 
solely designed to win the next elections, gives no clear picture. Nordhaus (1975) finds 
evidence of this for two out of four elections in the United States. Galli and Rossi (2002) find 
only weak support for the opportunistic school. Evidence for partisan politics, where policy is 
primarily driven by party ideology, is also mixed. Alesina (1989), Boix (2000), Cusack 
(1997), Hibbs (1977), Tavares (2004) and Reed (2006), for example, find support for the 
partisan theory, whereas Heckelman (2002), Seitz (2000), and Galli and Rossi (2002), for 
instance, find no evidence for it.
3
  
Coalition governments are expected to issue more debt than single-party governments. Again, 
empirical evidence is not clear cut. Roubini and Sachs (1989) find support. Re-estimating the 
                                                 
3
Table 1 in the Appendix offers a more detailed (but still partial) review of the empirical literature related to our 
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Roubini and Sachs model, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) challenge their view and argue that the 
coalition effect identified in Roubini and Sachs (1989) is a result of minority governments 
rather than political fragmentation. Using a different data set, de Haan and Sturm (1997) find 
no coalition effects – neither with the dispersion index used by Roubini and Sachs nor with 
the one used by Edin and Ohlsson. In a recent study on debt of the Flemish municipalities, 
Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2005) find that political fragmentation affects local 
indebtedness only in the short but not in the long run. Within a coalition government, a strong 
finance minister can make the rest of the cabinet consider the full costs of increased 
borrowing. This, in turn, may result in lower deficits (see von Hagen, 1992; Hallerberg and 
von Hagen, 1999).  
We estimate a dynamic panel data model and find evidence for opportunistic behavior: debt 
issue is significantly lower in pre-election years. Thus, German voters seem to favor fiscal 
discipline or, at least, the incumbent may believe they do. There is no evidence for partisan 
behavior. We find evidence for coalitions issuing more debt than single party governments. 
This effect, however, vanishes if the finance minister and the prime minister have the same 
party affiliation - a situation where the finance minister is likely to be in a strong position.  
The first econometric study with German data that considers political variables as covariates 
is Frey and Schneider (1979). The current paper, however, is most related to Seitz (2000) and 
Galli and Rossi (2002) who also analyze the political economy of German Länder fiscal 
policy. Seitz considers the time period from 1976 to 1996 whereas Galli and Rossi analyze the 
period from 1974 to 1994. While Seitz concentrates on partisan politics and deficit data, Galli 
and Rossi are more ambitious and additionally test for political business cycles using deficits, 
expenditures and expenditure categories. Although we focus on public deficits, we extend 
these two studies along three lines. First, we explicitly address the role of coalition 
governments and the position of the finance minister within a coalition government and 
                                                                                                                                                        
study. 
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thereby gain a number of new insights. Second, due to the availability of better estimation 
methods, we also econometrically go beyond Seitz and Galli and Rossi. Seitz only applies the 
least squares dummy variable estimator. As this estimator may be severely biased in short 
panels we use the bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator that clearly 
outperforms the uncorrected version (see, e.g., Bruno, 2005). Galli and Rossi deal with 
heteroscedasticity but also ignore the bias. Finally, we use data from 1960 to 2005 and 
thereby extend the analysis from 21 to 46 years. Note that this extension is crucial since all 
three studies rely on within state variation to tease out statistically significant covariates.
4
  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the institutional background for Germany is 
provided. The hypotheses to be tested are derived in Section 3. We thereby review the 
theoretical literature on the political economy of debt issue. The empirical model and the 
different estimators applied are introduced in Section 4. The data set and the results are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
2. Institutional background 
1. Germany’s federal political design 
The name “Federal Republic of Germany” (FRG) already highlights the country’s federal 
structure that is reflected by the levels of government: federal (Bund), state (Land) and local 
(Gemeinde). Since German unification in 1990 Germany consists of sixteen Länder, the ten 
Länder of former West Germany, the five new Länder of former East Germany (German 
Democratic Republic, GDR), and Berlin. From World War II to unification, Berlin was 
divided into West Berlin and East Berlin, where the latter was the capital of the GDR. 
Additionally, there are about 14,000 cities and communities, which form the local level (Seitz, 
                                                 
4
We ran our empirical models on shorter time periods, including those used in Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi 
(2002) and largely lose significance. In other words, the differences in results between our paper and the other 
two are mainly due to the much longer time period that we consider. 
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2000, p. 188).  
The Länder are not mere provinces, they are states endowed with their own powers. These 
powers and responsibilities are specified in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Germany’s 
constitution. The Basic Law also guarantees the local authorities the right to independently 
administer their own affairs. As the local authorities rely heavily on grants from the states, 
their independence is rather limited. Three large German cities, namely, Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg, form their own states (Länder). These are the so-called “city-states” (Stadtstaaten) 
that do not have local administrative bodies. In contrast, the other German states are called 
“non-city-states” (Flächenländer). This distinction is important since the budgets of the city-
states include expenditures and revenues that are part of the local budgets in non-city-states. 
Moreover, the expenditures of the non-city-states include grants to the local authorities 
whereas there are no such grants to local authorities in the city-states. Consequently, public 
expenditures or public debt of the two types of states are not directly comparable.
5
  
Our study examines the budget deficits of the Länder without taking the local authorities into 
account. As mentioned above, local authorities have their own budgets and their own 
parliaments. Election dates typically differ between local and state jurisdictions. As a 
consequence, the aggregated local political structure will hardly ever match the political 
structure of the state. Since the state government cannot be held responsible for deficits at the 
local level (net of state grants) it is logically consistent to concentrate on state level debt and 
neglect deficits arising at the local level.
6
  
2. Fiscal federalism in Germany 
Although the Länder are endowed with their own powers, an almost total lack of tax setting 
autonomy exists. Additionally, a large fiscal equalization system harmonizes revenues across 
                                                 
5
In our empirical model, the state fixed effects account for that fundamental difference as well as for other time 
invariant state characteristics. 
6
For the same reason, the other two papers analyzing fiscal variables of the German states, namely, Seitz (2000) 
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states, calculated on the basis of several fiscal and economic indicators, and this strongly 
distorts incentives to increase the tax base. The situation in Germany, therefore, differs in one 
major aspect from the theoretical literature on the political economy of public expenditures: 
typically the government has two options for financing expenditures – taxes and debt. But, 
due to the lack of tax setting autonomy and the equalization scheme, total revenue of every 
Land is more or less fixed (for a more detailed overview see Seitz, 2000, pp. 188-190). To 
finance public expenditures, Länder governments only have one discretionary source of 
financing at their disposal, namely debt. We therefore concentrate on public deficits and their 
political determinants.  
There are two more important aspects: First, in 1990, the five new Länder of former East 
Germany and East Berlin joined the FRG, enlarging the population from around 64 million to 
roughly 80 million, while the GDP only increased by less than 10 per cent. The integration of 
East Germany into the West German social security system, the huge investments in 
infrastructure and various other costs of transformation created a substantial fiscal shock. 
Although during the first five years after unification most of the direct financial burden was 
borne by the federal government via a so-called unification fund (Fonds Deutsche Einheit), 
we control for unification in our empirical analysis. Secondly, from 1995 onwards, the new 
German Länder, i.e., former East Germany, and Berlin were included in the fiscal 
equalization system. A large part of this equalization is amongst the Länder (horizontal 
equalization). As the new participants were net recipients, this introduced a fiscal burden on 
the Western Länder, an effect that we account for in our analysis.  
Finally, two German states, namely Bremen and Saarland, were bailed out by the federal 
government. From 1994 onwards they received transfers over and above those of the fiscal 
equalization scheme. This bailout is likely to reduce debt issue in both states. Moreover, one 
could imagine that the occurrence of a federal bailout alters the incentives of the states to 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Galli and Rossi (2002), also concentrate on data at the state level. 
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issue debt in general. Our empirical model considers all these aspects.  
3. Political parties 
In Germany, there are four major parties. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green party (GREEN). 
While CDU, SPD and FDP ran for elections in the entire period under study here, the Greens 
did not. The Green party was founded in 1980 and first won parliamentary seats at the state 
level in Hamburg and Hesse in 1982 and at the federal level in 1983. Due to historical 
developments after World War II, the CDU has never run for elections in Bavaria. Instead 
their so-called sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), participates. The programs of 
CDU and CSU, however, are very similar and they always form one parliamentary group in 
the federal parliament (Bundestag). Therefore, we do not distinguish between them and label 
both CDU.  
After unification, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was founded, a successor to the 
United Socialist Party (SED), the party that ruled East Germany for more than 40 years. 
Although the PDS has significant influence in the new Länder, it has not succeeded in gaining 
any influence in the Western Länder.
7
 ,
8
As the democratic history of the East German states 
is rather short, we abstain from including them in our analysis. Due to its special status, Berlin 
is also eliminated from the data set (see below for more details).  
Since 1960 the West German Länder have either been governed by majority governments of 
the CDU or SPD or by a coalition that mostly consisted of two parties. The SPD has formed 
coalitions with all three other parties, whereas the CDU has only formed coalitions with the 
SPD (a so-called ‘grand coalition’) or the FDP. Minority governments as well as other 
government constellations have played a negligible role. Table 3 in the Appendix provides, 
                                                 
7
In 2007 the PDS merged with the WASG. The latter largely consisted of disappointed former social democrats 
and union members. The so-formed new party, DIE LINKE, is about to gain influence in West-German states. 
8
To some extent, Berlin is an exception as the SPD currently forms a coalition with the DIE LINKE. Note, 
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among other things, an overview of government formations in the West German states.
9
  
3. The political economy of public deficits 
There is a large number of conflicting theories explaining the formation and the evolution of 
public deficits. In this section we review (part of) the theoretical literature and derive the 
respective hypotheses to be tested in Section 5. Our focus is on three theories, namely, 
political opportunism, partisan theory, and fragmented governments.  
1. Political opportunism 
Opportunistic governments are assumed to be primarily interested in being reelected. There 
are no ideological motives. Although originally introduced in the context of the ‘Phillips 
curve’ (see Nordhaus, 1975; MacRae, 1977), Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that the theory of political opportunism can also be applied to 
public deficits: to appear competent to voters, the government has an incentive to boost the 
economy thereby improving the chances of being reelected. Such policies mostly require 
raising transfers or increasing public investments (e.g., infrastructure, housing, and hospitals). 
As German states are hardly able to influence their returns, the augmented public expenditure 
will result in (further) debt, especially in election years.
10
  
This strategy only works if voters do not (fully) anticipate that the debt burden must be borne 
after the election. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) demonstrated, however, that opportunistic cycles 
may also occur under rational expectations. They developed a theory where opportunistic 
cycles originate in temporary information asymmetries between government and voters. The 
government tries to exploit its information advantage by running low deficits; this signals that 
the government can provide a given level of public goods reasonably efficiently. Since 
                                                                                                                                                        
however, that today’s Berlin is not a former Western Land. 
9
For an explanation of the variables see Table 2 in the Appendix. 
10
Of course, one may argue that if the election is early in the year expenditures should raise in the pre-election 
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deficits are visible to voters with a time lag, low deficits are expected to occur in pre-election 
years.  
The main idea behind rational opportunistic cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) is the same as 
behind opportunistic cycles of the Nordhaus type: in order to win the upcoming election, the 
government is prepared to introduce distorted policies. In the former case this leads to lower 
deficits in pre-election years and, in the latter case, to higher deficits in election and possibly 
pre-election years. Without any time pattern in deficits around elections there is no evidence 
for opportunistic cycles.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Public deficits in pre-election years and in election years are no different than 
in all other years.  
Consider that a government can be sure of being reelected. In the German case, Bavaria 
serves as an example, where the CSU has been in office since the 1950s. Without any risk of 
being thrown out of office, there is no incentive to introduce distorted policies. Thus, finding 
no evidence for political opportunism may simply reflect political stability.  
2. Partisan theory 
Partisan theory suggests that government politics are primarily driven by ideological motives 
and, accordingly, predicts a more expansionary policy for left governments than for right 
governments. Left governments, for instance, are typically more inclined to favor 
redistributive policies. Public spending may therefore be directed towards mitigating income 
inequality by increasing transfers. With fixed returns, as in our case, such programs may 
require debt issue. In short, partisan theory suggests that if left governments are in office then 
debt issue will be higher than otherwise. To actually identify partisan effects, ideology of 
competing parties must be sufficiently different and ideally time invariant - and this is exactly 
                                                                                                                                                        
year. We discuss this in some detail in Section 5.1. 
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what was traditionally assumed (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977).  
It may be a bit naive to claim that a party’s policy is solely driven by ideology; parties also 
care about winning the next election. But then the policies of two competing parties will 
converge unless voters are irrational or at least one party has a sufficiently low discount factor 
(Alesina, 1988). Since policy convergence precludes identification of partisan effects a closer 
look at this topic is warranted.  
Consider a two-party system where both parties, right and left, are equally well informed and 
both care about winning elections. In electoral competition both parties will adopt the same 
platform – the one that maximizes the probability of being elected. If parties are not 
committed to their platform then, once elected, they implement their most favored policy. 
Irrational voters will not anticipate the parties’ incentives to deviate from their platform and 
partisan effects may result. Alesina (1988) argued that this result also holds under rational 
expectations when electoral competition is considered a one-shot game. Rational voters 
anticipate the parties’ incentive to deviate from any announced policy other than their optimal 
policy so that the only time-consistent equilibrium must have diverging platforms.  
In an infinitely repeated game the ideological difference between parties may be blurred when 
a cooperative policy (that both parties agree upon prior to elections) can be supported as an 
equilibrium (see Alesina, 1988). If the elected party deviates and implements its most favored 
policy, then cooperation becomes incredible and parties end up playing their non-cooperative 
Nash strategies. Deviation is beneficial if the current gain of implementing the desired policy 
is larger than the future loss originating in the breakdown of cooperation. This is likely to be 
the case for low discount factors, a situation where reputation only plays a minor role. Note 
that sustainable cooperation precludes partisan effects even if parties’ ideologies diverge. This 
is unproblematic for testing for partisan effects since we are not trying to identify different 
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ideologies but whether different ideologies find their way into fiscal policy.
11
 We can, 
therefore, write our second hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Deficits are independent of government ideology, that is, deficits of left 
governments are no different to deficits of right governments.  
3. Fragmented governments 
The theories discussed so far have modeled electoral competition between two parties that 
simultaneously aim at political power. With only two parties, there is no conflict once one 
party is elected. With more than two parties, coalition governments may arise, opening up 
another stage of conflict.  
In a coalition government each coalition partner tries to allocate as much of the budget as 
possible to its constituency. Partners come up with spending proposals that are asymmetric in 
the sense that benefits primarily go to the respective constituency but costs are equally shared 
amongst coalition partners. Since costs are not fully internalized coalition governments face a 
common pool problem where too high spending proposals translate into higher budget deficits 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1997, pp. 68-71.) Since the fraction of internalized costs decreases 
with coalition size, borrowing is expected to increase with coalition size. Our next hypothesis, 
again in its null-form, can then be stated as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Borrowing is independent of how many parties form the government.  
 
An obvious criticism of the Persson/Tabellini argument is that all partners have control over 
some part of the budget and none of the parties is responsible for the entire budget. 
                                                 
11
Note that we concentrate on public deficits. It may well be that there are no partisan effects in borrowing but in 
the structure of public spending (see, for instance, Drazen and Eslava, 2005). 
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Centralization of financial responsibility would yield efficiency.
12
 The extent to which the 
common pool problem actually translates into higher debt depends on the degree of 
centralization of fiscal policy and thus on the position of the finance minister in the coalition 
government. Like most politicians, finance ministers will typically care about their prestige, 
which is partly determined by their ability to form a solid budget. As a result, the interests of 
the finance minister in terms of borrowing should be well aligned with those of the society 
(Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999). A strong finance minister is therefore expected to be able 
to mitigate the common pool problem so that borrowing is lower as compared to coalitions 
with a weak finance minister.
13
  
 
Hypothesis 4: The position of the finance minister in a coalition government has no impact on 
borrowing.  
 
The actual strength of the finance minister is difficult to measure. If, however, finance and 
prime minister are members of the same party, then the position of the finance minister is 
likely to be stronger than otherwise.  
4. Empirical model 
In recent studies of public deficits or public expenditures the variable of interest has typically 
been transformed before running regressions. Cusack (1997) and Seitz (2000), for example, 
take its first difference as a share of the GDP. This is basically done in order to obtain 
stationary time series. We consider growth rates for the same purpose. The major advantage 
of our approach is that the GDP is not used in the construction of the dependent variable 
                                                 
12
An alternative theory that explains higher deficits for coalition governments is offered by Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1994, pp. 22-29): consider a permanent fiscal shock. Coalition partners will then 
fight about the allocation of the fiscal burden to the respective constituencies. This situation is well modeled by 
the ‘war of attrition’. In general, delayed adjustment to the fiscal shock will obtain, allowing debt to accumulate. 
13
Von Hagen (1992) found that a strong finance minister, or a dominant prime minister, advances fiscal 
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which could otherwise be a source of endogeneity. We consider the following dynamic panel 
data model  
 1 1 2it i t it it i itd d x zγ β β µ ε
′ ′
, −= + + + + ,  (1) 
where itd  denotes the nominal growth rate of public debt in state 1i N= ,...,  at time 1t T= ,...,  
and 1i td , −  its first lag, 2t T= ,..., .
14
 The political variables are summarized in the vector itx , 
the control variables in itz . We control for nominal GDP growth (GDP), the first and second 
oil crisis (OIL1, OIL2) as well as for German unification (UNIFIC) and for the inclusion of 
the East German states into the fiscal equalization scheme (EQUAL).
15
 As an identifying 
assumption we suggest that all relevant time effects are picked up by specifying a dynamic 
model and by including the additional time control variables: the oil crises dummies and the 
unification and fiscal equalization dummies. We refrain from adding time fixed effects to the 
model. This would introduce (imperfect) multi-collinearity into the model and prevent us 
from testing for political opportunism (Hypothesis 1) where variation over time is essential.
16
 
Potential direct and indirect effects of the federal government bailout are picked up by the 
variables BAILOUT, BAILOUTHB and BAILOUTSL, where the latter two are interactions 
between the variables BAILOUT and the state fixed effects for Bremen (HB) and Saarland 
(SL), respectively.
17
 Finally, debt issue may respond to the financial costs of borrowing, 
namely, the real interest rate (INTRATE). Note that the interest rate varies over time but not 
over states. This limits the explanatory power to within state variation.  
The time invariant state effect is given by iµ . We will consider these effects as fixed rather 
                                                                                                                                                        
discipline. 
14
Note that nominal debt growth is simply nominal deficit over nominal debt. 
15
Definition of all variables can be found in the Appendix in Table 2. 
16
 Elections are not uniformly distributed over time. This is why year dummies are correlated with the variables 
ELECTION and PREELEC. While the ELECTION coefficient is never statistically different from zero we lose 
significance for PREELEC in a model with time fixed effects. All other results reported below are robust to this 
alternative specification. 
17
One may argue that debt issue is influenced by the possibility of a federal bailout so that the bailout variables 
are endogenous. Since debt started to accumulate in the 1970s in most states, about 20 years prior to the first and 
so far only bailout, it is hard to imagine that borrowing incentives were influenced by the possibility of a bailout. 
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than random. It can be argued that there is no room for random effects as the entire 
population, i.e., all ten West German states, are included in the study. A more substantial 
argument is the existence of long-lasting governments. Bavaria, for instance, was ruled by the 
CSU for the entire period considered here. North-Rhine Westphalia is an example of almost 
continuous SPD government. Obviously we will have ( ) 0it iE x µ ≠ , i.e. state fixed effects.
18
 
Random disturbance is ),0(~ 2τσε Nit . Let ( )it it itw x z
′ ′ ′= | , then the assumptions of the model 
can be summarized as follows 
        0)( =jsitE εε  for ji ≠  or st ≠  
    0)( =jtiE εµ  for all tji ,,      (2) 
0)( =jsitwE ε  for all tsji ,,,  
As is well known, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent when a dynamic 
panel data model, like the one in equation (1), is to be estimated. The estimates of γ  will be 
biased upwards and the coefficients of the exogenous variables will be biased towards zero 
(see Hsiao, 1986, pp. 76-78). The fixed effects estimator (or Least-Squares Dummy Variable, 
LSDV, estimator) eliminates this source of inconsistency by taking account of the Länder 
fixed effects iµ . There nevertheless remains a bias, as the lagged endogenous variable is 
correlated with the transformed error term. Nickell (1981) showed that the fixed effects 
estimator for γ  may be seriously biased downwards in short panels.19  
Several consistent instrumental variable methods have been developed that, in general, can 
improve on the LSDV estimates. These estimators typically consider the first difference 
version of the model described in equation (1),  
                                                                                                                                                        
Moreover, there is no rule or directive specifying when the federal government has to step in. There is, thus, no 
reason to believe that the corresponding variables are endogenous. 
18
The Hausman test suggests that the random effects model is consistent. Note, however, that the test requires 
that the fixed effects estimator is consistent. As this is clearly violated in a dynamic model (see below) we follow 
our intuitive argument and use fixed effects. 
19
He also showed, however, that the bias approaches zero as T  tends to infinity. Since T  is relatively large in 
our study ( 46T = ), the bias is likely to be moderate. Note that although T  is much smaller in Seitz (2000, 
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 1 1 2it i t it it itd d x zγ β β ε
′ ′
, −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ,  (3) 
where ∆  is the first difference operator, e.g., 1it it i td d d , −∆ = − . This transformation eliminates 
the (time invariant) fixed effects. The estimator developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982, AH 
estimator), for example, uses 2i td , −  as an instrument for 1i td , −∆  and thereby removes the 
source of the bias. The generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond 
(1991), henceforth AB estimator, uses all valid lags of the dependent variable (in levels) as 
instruments for itd∆ . The AB estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient (when N  
tends to infinity).
20
 Due to the larger set of instruments, AB is more efficient than AH. There 
is a homoscedastic (one-step) version of the AB estimator and a two-step version, that, by 
allowing for heteroscedasticity, may improve efficiency. Simulation studies have shown, 
however, that the two-step AB is – in most cases – less efficient than the one-step AB, i.e. the 
two-step AB yields higher standard errors (see, e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; Kiviet, 1995; 
Judson and Owen, 1997). In principle, efficiency gains may be achievable when applying the 
system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), henceforth BB estimator. However, both the AB and the BB estimator are micro panel 
data estimators and have poor finite sample properties. As N  is small in our study ( 10N = ), 
results of both estimators should mainly be seen as robustness checks.  
A more reliable estimator is the bias corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC). The bias may be 
approximated to the order of 1( )O T −  when using the approximation derived in Nickell (1981), 
1 1( )O T N− −  when using Kiviet (1995), and 1 2( )O T N− −  when using Kiviet (1999). In a 
simulation study, Bun and Kiviet (2003) show that the Kiviet (1999) approximation accounts 
for about 90 per cent of the actual bias. Several simulation studies have shown that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
21T = ) and Galli and Rossi (2002, 21T = ) both studies use the LSDV estimator. 
20
We consider the regressors summarized in itw  as strictly exogenous so that variables themselves and all their 
lags are valid instruments. Furthermore, note that the AB estimator takes first order autocorrelation of ε∆  into 
account. Thus, neither consistency nor efficiency is affected by first order autocorrelation. But second order 
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LSDVC estimator outperforms the consistent estimators described above in terms of both bias 
and standard errors (see, e.g., Bruno, 2005 and Judson and Owen, 1997, 1999). We therefore 
use the LSDVC estimator for our analysis.  
To actually correct the bias one needs an initial consistent estimate of the coefficients and 
each of the three estimators AH, AB and BB may be used. As the AB estimator typically 
outperforms the AH estimator and appears more robust than the BB estimator (see Bruno, 
2005), we opt for the AB estimator and use the Kiviet (1999) bias approximation. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions.
21
  
5. Empirical analysis 
The data set comprises yearly data for 10 West German states from 1960 to 2005. In the early 
years of the FRG, i.e. before 1960, the party structure was relatively unstable. Several small 
regional parties joined state governments for short periods and disappeared afterwards. 
Additionally, different coalitions governed within one election period. As this was clearly just 
a post-war phenomenon, we do not include these years into our analysis. As already 
mentioned, Berlin and the five new German Länder have not been included in our sample. 
Berlin is excluded for two reasons. First, Berlin was divided before 1990. While East Berlin 
was the capital of the GDR, West Berlin was part of the FRG. Second, West Berlin received 
generous grants from the federal government, making debt issue more or less unnecessary. 
Data for the East German Länder are available from 1990 onwards. We nevertheless do not 
include them, as the period is simply too short to obtain sufficient (political) within state 
variation. We arrive at a balanced panel with 460 observations. The average annual nominal 
GDP growth was 5.8 per cent, whereas the average annual nominal debt grew with 9.7 per 
cent. We capture the costs of borrowing by the interest rate. Since borrowing incentives are 
                                                                                                                                                        
correlation implies inconsistency (Arellano and Bond, 1991, pp. 281-282). 
21
The estimates with BB as initial estimator have slightly higher standard errors. Apart from that results remain 
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primarily influenced by the real interest rate, we use – without qualitatively changing results – 
the real interest rate as a control variable rather than the nominal one.
22
  
Before testing the political economy of debt issue, we briefly discuss the results with 
economic indicators and some controls only (Model 1). The regression results are shown in 
the first column of Table 4 (see Appendix). With a coefficient of around .36, autoregression is 
relatively moderate. The impact of nominal GDP growth is, as expected, significantly 
negative. When nominal GDP growth drops by one percentage point debt growth gears up by 
roughly 0.3 percentage points. This may be due to expenditure programs, reduced tax 
revenues, or both. Both the first and second oil crisis, OIL1 and OIL2, respectively, increased 
debt growth significantly. German unification had a negative impact on debt growth in West 
Germany. Its insignificance may be due to the fact that most of the financial burden of 
unification was borne by the social security systems and the German unification fund and not 
by the states. Moreover, the economy boomed right after unification, increasing tax revenues. 
This may explain why no further state debt was needed. We find no significant effect of the 
inclusion of the East German Länder into the fiscal equalization system (EQUAL) on public 
debt growth. The costs of borrowing, measured by the real interest rate (INTRATE), have the 
expected negative but insignificant impact on debt issue. Finally, the federal government 
bailout helped to consolidate the budgets of Saarland and Bremen.
23
 A comparison of 
coefficients and standard errors of models 1 to 3 (Table 4) reveals that results are largely 
robust to including political variables.  
                                                                                                                                                        
unchanged. The complete estimates for the BB and AH estimator are available upon request. 
22
Deficit data are taken from the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office, 2005). Data for the gross 
domestic product (GDP) was provided by the Statistical Office of Baden Württemberg and the Federal Statistical 
Office. Interest rates were deflated by the consumer price index for all households obtained from the 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006), because we are convinced that politicians take real not nominal interest rates as 
decision parameter for raising new/additional debts. The election dates as well as the election results in both 
percentage of votes and numbers of seats were taken from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2007, Election 
Research Team). 
23
Note that the variables EQUAL and BAILOUT are highly correlated; they only differ in 1994. Even if we drop 
one of them we do not gain significance of the other. All results remain unchanged if we rerun regressions 
without BAILOUTHB and BAILOUTSL. So there seems to be no significant incentive effect on debt issue 
arising from the occurrence of the bailout. 
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1. Political opportunism (Hypothesis 1) 
Before we test the hypotheses let us first take a brief look at the descriptive statistics shown in 
Table 3 (part A and B) in the Appendix. The average debt growth rate calculated over all 
years and all states is 9.7 per cent. For election years, we find a growth rate of as much as 
10.4 per cent and for pre-election years 8.0 per cent.  
These numbers suggest that there may be an opportunistic cycle. To actually test Hypothesis 1 
we include two dummy variables in our regression: ELECTION and PREELEC. The first 
variable equals 1 in election years and zero otherwise, the second accordingly for pre-election 
years.  
Table 4, column 2, in the Appendix reveals that debt growth in election years is not 
significantly different from reference years. In contrast debt growth is significantly lower in 
pre-election years. Debt growth in preelection years is about two percentage points smaller 
than in reference years. Although the effect is statistically significant the magnitude appears 
to be small. But when relating this number to average debt growth we arrive at a 20 per cent 
lower debt growth in pre-election years: the effect is substantial! We are thus able to reject 
Hypothesis 1: there is an opportunistic cycle that brings about significantly lower deficits in 
pre-election years. This result allows us to conclude that German voters seem to favor fiscal 
discipline.
24
 Although results do not allow us to discriminate between rational and non-
rational expectations, our result is in line with the theory developed by Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988).  
Defining the variables ELECTION and PREELEC using the calendar year of the election date 
is arbitrary. Table 5 in the Appendix shows that there are only minor changes when 
alternative (and also arbitrary) cut-off dates are used. Suppose the cut-off is January 31. If an 
election is, for example, held in January 1982, then 1981 is considered the election year and 
                                                 
24
This differs from Galli and Rossi (2002) who found significantly positive election year effects but no pre-
election year effects. 
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1980 the pre-election year. An election in February 1982 would then have 1982 as the 
election year and 1981 as the pre-election year. Estimation results with this cut-off are shown 
in column 2 of Table 5 (column 1 repeats the results reported in Table 4 to ease comparison). 
The remaining 3 columns have cut-offs February 28/29, March 31, and June 30, respectively. 
Results for cut-offs January, February, and March do not significantly differ from those 
reported in the first column (December). This robustness is very reassuring as we actually 
found an opportunistic cycle. This robustness, however, is not too surprising since there are 
very few elections early in a year (only 8 per cent of all elections were held in January or 
February). The results with the June cut-off are different, though. We find a negative effect in 
election and pre-election years and both effects are statistically significant.
25
 This strengthens 
our assertion that German voters seem to favor fiscal discipline.  
One might ask whether the strategy of lower debt issue in pre-election years is used equally 
across parties or whether there are some government constellations that make more use of this 
tool than others (see Table 4, Model 3 for results). We constructed pre-election party 
interaction for all parties and, controlling for party effects, find no significant difference in 
coefficients.  
2. Partisan theory (Hypothesis 2) 
To check whether fiscal policy is driven by party ideology, we have to assign every 
government constellation to either left or right. We categorize SPD governments, SPD/FDP 
coalitions and SPD/GREEN coalitions as left. CDU governments and CDU/FDP coalitions 
are labeled right. It is difficult to ascribe a political orientation to grand coalitions, i.e., 
coalitions formed by SPD and CDU. There are basically two alternatives. First, do not label 
such coalitions at all and use them as a reference category in the estimation. Second, use the 
                                                 
25
This result is not unexpected. As compared to the calendar coding (December cut-off), about half of the cases 
that were categorized as pre-election years now are election years so that, loosely speaking, the significance is 
partially transferred from the pre-election variable to the election variable. 
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party affiliation of the prime minister to assign an orientation. We opted for the second 
alternative as 27 observations of grand coalition governments out of 460 observations are 
simply too few observations for a sensible reference category.
26
 A similar reasoning applies to 
all other government constellations summarized in ELSE (also 27 of 460 observations). These 
government constellations are considered left when the Social Democrats were involved and 
right when the Christian Democrats were. When the government turns over from left to right, 
or vice versa, the question of whether the government should be labeled left or right in that 
particular year becomes an issue. We consider the new government’s ideological position if 
its inaugural date was prior to July 1 of the respective year.  
Before we interpret estimation results let us again first take a look at the descriptive statistics. 
Table 3 (part C) in the Appendix identifies right governments as the ones issuing more debt. 
As the difference in debt growth rates between right governments (9.9 per cent) and left 
governments (9.4 per cent) is – as compared to the standard errors – rather low, a significant 
partisan effect can hardly exist. So, not surprisingly, the corresponding coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero (Table 4, Model 2). Note, however, that the coefficient obeys 
the ‘correct’ sign.  
Although we are unable to reject Hypothesis 2 – which is well in line with Seitz (2000) and 
Galli and Rossi (2002) – interpretation remains difficult (see also the discussion in Subsection 
2). It may well be that there are no partisan trends in German Länder fiscal policy – that 
ideology plays a negligible role. This is, however, not necessarily true. Once the parties care 
not only about ideology but also about winning the next election, platform convergence will 
occur. Since elections can well be considered a repeated game, parties will stick to their 
platforms. Otherwise they risk their reputation: identifying the opponent as a liar is a powerful 
weapon in electoral competition. If reputation is decisive, then platform convergence implies 
policy convergence and, with it, adaptation of fiscal policies. Differences can hardly be 
                                                 
26
Results are independent of the alternative adopted. 
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detected. And indeed, for Germany, it is usually claimed that both major parties, SPD and 
CDU, are close to the center.  
3. Fragmented governments (Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
231 observations of coalition governments yield an average debt growth of 9.4 per cent 
compared to 9.9 per cent for the 219 observations with single-party governments. In 172 of 
these 231 observations of coalitions governments – or in 74 per cent of the cases – the prime 
minister and the finance minister belonged to the same party. For these 172 cases debt grew 
by 8.7 per cent on average. These descriptive statistics (see also Table 3, part D in the 
Appendix) raise doubts as to whether we will be able to reject Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
However, one should be cautious when interpreting cross state averages. We, therefore, define 
the indicator variable COAL that assumes a value of 1 whenever more than one party formed 
the government and zero otherwise.
27
 We find a highly significant coalition effect, that is, we 
can reject Hypothesis 3. The positive sign is perfectly in line with the theory discussed in 
Section 3. Note also that if compared to the pre-election effect (in absolute terms), the 
coalition effect is about three times as high: debt growth in a coalition government is more 
than 6 percentage points higher than with single party governments.  
As argued in Section 3 the more parties forming the coalition, the more severe the common 
pool problem. We are unable to address this issue for the German states since there are only 
12 observations where more than two parties formed a coalition.  
Hypothesis 4 states that the position of the finance minister is irrelevant for a government’s 
borrowing decision. A strong finance minister, however, may be able to mitigate the common 
pool problem by centralizing fiscal policy at least to some degree. We define the variable 
SAMECOAL that assumes the value 1 whenever there is a coalition government where the 
prime minister and the finance minister have the same party affiliation and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
27
Again, in years of government changes, we use the inaugural date of the new government and July 1 as the cut-
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This variable is then used as a proxy for the power of the finance minister. We find a 
statistically significant negative effect on borrowing. This effect exactly offsets the coalition 
effect (the absolute values of the estimated coefficients of COAL and SAMECOAL are not 
statistically distinguishable) so that coalition governments with a strong finance minister do 
not suffer from the common pool problem at all and borrow like single party governments. In 
other words, a strong finance minister solves the common pool problem.
28
  
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
We analyzed the political determinants of the West German Länder deficits from 1960 to 
2005. Since political institutions and electoral rules are almost identical across German states, 
our study does not suffer from the fundamental problem of disentangling the effects of 
political variables from the impact of political institutions that typically arises when 
comparing jurisdictions.  
Overall we addressed four hypotheses taken from the broad theoretical literature on the 
political economy of public expenditures and/or public debt issue. While ideological motives 
play no role, we found that debt growth is significantly lower in pre-election years. This is 
well in line with the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) argument of signaling fiscal competence via 
low debt. With a 20 per cent lower debt growth rate in pre-election years the effect is large. 
We also found a positive and significant coalition effect on debt issue. In absolute terms, the 
effect is about three times larger than the pre-election effect. There seems to be some kind of 
coordination failure within coalition governments. Interestingly, this problem vanishes if the 
prime minister and the finance minister belong to the same party (within a coalition 
government), so that the finance minister can be considered powerful. Borrowing of coalition 
governments then is not significantly different to the borrowing of single-party governments.  
                                                                                                                                                        
off date to assign a value to COAL. 
28
We are indebted to an anonymous referee for motivating us to investigate the role of the finance minister. 
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Three policy implications can be derived from our results. First, the problem of opportunistic 
political business cycles results in inefficient borrowing over time, an issue that can be 
countered by improving transparency of the budgetary process (Alt and Lassen, 2005). First 
measures are about to be implemented in Germany. The largest of the 16 German Länder, 
North-Rhine Westphalia, is currently implementing a report system on fiscal sustainability of 
its budget. The aim is to increase transparency in fiscal affairs. There are a number of 
international examples where measures have been taken to advance transparency. The US, 
Australia, and the UK, for instance, have installed report mechanisms on budgetary and fiscal 
developments. This eases the assessment of medium and long-term fiscal development and 
also informs the electorate about the key fiscal indicators.  
Second, Duverger’s law suggests that countries with majoritarian electoral systems are more 
likely to have single-party governments and countries with proportional electoral systems are 
more likely to have coalition governments.
29
 Thus, the question of whether coalition 
governments have different incentives to issue debt than single-party governments is of some 
importance for the design of the electoral system. As coalition governments (with a weak 
finance minister) yield significantly higher debt growth than single-party governments, a 
switch to a majoritarian electoral system may contribute to fiscal stabilization.  
Finally, and related to the previous paragraph, the internal organization of a government is 
decisive for fiscal stability. So when coalition governments form, economic advisers may 
wish to recommend that the prime minister and the finance minister belong to the same party. 
As our results suggest, debt growth can then expected to be lower than otherwise.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Literature overview 
 
 
Study  
 
Data  Dependent variable  Political variables & results  
Alesina (1989)  12 OECD countries 
(1966-1986)  
economic growth  
unemployment, inflation 
evidence for partisan political  
business cycles 
Alesina, Cohen and 
Roubini (1993)  
14 OECD countries 
(1960-1987)  
economic growth, 
unemployment,  
public expenditures, 
inflation, money supply  
evidence for rational opportunistic 
business cycles (Rogoff and Sibert) 
only for the last three dep. variables  
Alesina and Sachs 
(1988)  
United States  
(1949-1984)  
economic growth  
money supply (M1)  
evidence for partisan effects for both 
dependent variables  
 
Ashworth, Geys 
and Heyndels 
(2005)  
Flemish 
Municipalities  
(1977-2000)  
 
government debt  government fragmentation plays a 
role in the short but not in the long 
run  
Belke (2000)  Germany  
(1970-1996)  
various labor market 
variables  
evidence for short and long term 
partisan influences  
 
Boix (2000)  19 OECD countries 
(1960-1993)  
 
interest rate  
public debt  
evidence for partisan trends  
Bräuninger (2005) 19 OECD countries 
(1971-1999)  
government spending  
(general and social 
security)  
 
partisan effects in spending patterns  
Cusack (1997)  16 OECD countries 
(1955-1989)  
 
general government 
spending 
evidence for partisan trends  
Drazen and Eslava 
(2005)  
Colombian 
municipalities  
(1987-2000)  
 
government spending  
(expenditure categories)  
evidence for partisan effects, voters 
penalize incumbents for deficits 
occurring prior to elections  
To be continued next page 
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Study  
 
Data  Dependent variable  Political variables & results  
Edin and Ohlsson 
(1991)  
 
13 OECD countries 
(1960-1985)  
public deficit  Roubini and Sachs (1989) results  
are driven by minority governments  
Galli and Rossi 
(2002)  
11 West German 
states  
(1974-1994)  
government expenditures 
deficits/surplus  
expenditure categories  
no partisan trends  
evidence for political business cycle 
(election years)  
De Haan and 
Sturm (1997)  
 
21 OECD countries 
(1982-1992)  
public deficit  no evidence for an effect of 
government fragmentation  
Canada (1965-1994) 
Germany (1977-
1994)  
Heckelman (2002) 
UK (1960-1993)  
 
economic growth  
unemployment  
evidence for persistent partisan 
effects,  
party popularity affects business 
cycle  
Heckelman (2006) 7 OECD countries  
(1960-1993)  
unemployment  almost no evidence for partisan 
effects  
(except US for democrat victories)  
 
Hibbs (1977)  12 OECD countries 
(1945-1969)  
 
unemployment  
inflation  
evidence for partisan effects  
Nordhaus (1975)  9 OECD countries  
(1947-1972)  
 
unemployment  evidence for opportunistic political 
business cycles  
Reed (2006)  United States, 45 
states  
(1960-2000)  
 
tax burden  evidence for partisan effects (higher  
tax burden with democrat 
governments)  
Roubini and Sachs 
(1989)  
13 OECD countries 
(1960-1985)  
public deficit  coalition governments run higher 
deficits than single party 
governments  
 
Seitz (2000)  10 West German 
states  
(1976-1996)  
expenditures, deficits and 
alternative economic 
variables  
no evidence for partisan effects  
Tavares (2004)  19 OECD countries 
(1960-1995)  
tax revenue  
public expenditures  
evidence for partisan effects  
(left: higher tax revenue,  
right: lower spending)  
 
Veiga and Veiga 
(2007)  
278 Portuguese 
municipalities  
(1979-2001)  
 
debt, tax revenue, public 
expenditures and others  
evidence for opportunistic political 
business cycles (pre-election effects) 
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Table 2: Explanation of variables 
 
Variable Explanation 
DEFICIT  nominal debt growth rate  
DEFICIT(-1)  lagged nominal debt growth rate  
GDP  nominal growth rate of gross domestic product  
INTRATE  real interest rate  
OIL1  = 1 from 1974 to 1975 (first oil crisis)  
OIL2  = 1 from 1978 to 1981 (second oil crisis)  
UNIFIC  = 1 from 1991 to 2005 (unification)  
EQUAL  = 1 from 1995 to 2005 (equalization scheme)  
BAILOUT  = 1 from 1994 to 2005 (federal government bailout)  
BAILOUTHB  = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Bremen (Bailout-Bremen interaction)  
BAILOUTSL  = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Saarland (Bailout-Saarland interaction)  
ELECTION  = 1 in election years  
PREELEC  = 1 in pre-election years  
LEFT  = 1 for SPD dominated governments  
RIGHT  = 1 for CDU dominated governments  
SPD  = 1 for single-party Social Democratic governments  
CDU  = 1 for single-party Christian Democratic governments  
SPDFDP  = 1 for SPD coalitions with Liberals  
SPDGREEN  = 1 for SPD coalitions with Greens  
GRANDC  = 1 for SPD coalitions with the CDU or vice versa  
SPDCDU  = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and SPD prime minister  
CDUSPD  = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and CDU prime minister  
CDUFDP  = 1 for CDU coalitions with Liberals  
ELSE  = 1 for remaining government constellations  
COAL  = 1 for coalition governments  
COALSIZE  number of parties in a coalition  
SAMECOAL  = 1 if prime and finance minister belong to the same party in a coalition 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Variable N  mean  s.d.  min  max  
A  DEFICIT  450  .0967  .1174  -.1500  1.2632  
 GDP  450  .0577  .0378  -.0242  .1906  
 INTRATE  460  .0407  .0162  .0112  .0790  
 SPD  460  .2043  .4037  0  1  
 SPDFDP  460  .1565  .3637  0  1  
 SPDGREEN  460  .0783  .2689  0  1  
 SPDCDU  460  .0348  .1834  0  1  
 CDU  460  .2739  .4465  0  1  
 CDUSPD  460  .0239  .1529  0  1  
 CDUFDP  460  .1696  .3757  0  1  
 ELSE  460  .0587  .2353  0  1  
 GRANDC  460  .0587  .2353  0  1  
B  DEFICIT*ELECTION  110  .1037  .1232  -.0700  .9814  
 DEFICIT*PREELEC  111  .0799  .0988  -.1500  .4189  
C  LEFT  460  .5130  .5004  0  1  
 RIGHT  460  .4870  .5004  0  1  
 DEFICIT*LEFT  232  .0942  .1077  -.0886  .9814  
 DEFICIT*RIGHT  218  .0992  .1272  -.1500  1.2632  
D  COAL  460  .5217  .5001  0  1  
 COALSIZE  460  1.5565  .5631  1  3  
 DEFICIT*COAL  231  .0943  .1408  -.1500  1.2632  
 DEFICIT*(1−COAL)  219  .0991  .0864  -.0621  .4767  
 DEFICIT*SAMECOAL 172  .0874  .1148  -.1500  .9814  
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Table 4: Regression results 
 
Variable LSDVC (model 1) LSDVC (model 2) LSDVC (model 3) 
DEFICIT(-1)     .3616***  (.0470)     .3581***  (.0463)     .3631***  (.0461)  
GDP  − .2864**  (.1504)  − .3659**  (.1485)  − .3137**  (.1517)  
INTRATE  − .3949  (.3859)  − .0924  (.3985)  − .1760  (.4109)  
OIL1     .1899***  (.0266)     .1991***  (.0265)     .1905***  (.0272)  
OIL2     .0352**  (.0169)     .0438***  (.0168)     .0369**  (.0178)  
UNIFIC  − .0182  (.0209)  − .0177  (.0213)  − .0189  (.0215)  
EQUAL     .0103  (.0323)     .0077  (.0317)     .0098  (.0337)  
BAILOUT  − .0384  (.0346)  − .0268  (.0343)  − .0361  (.0363)  
BAILOUTHB  − .0205  (.0355)  − .0673*  (.0376)  − .0399  (.0477)  
BAILOUTSL  − .0703**  (.0357)  − .0706*  (.0364)  − .0589  (.0387)  
ELECTION    − .0009  (.0112)     .0004  (.0115)  
PREELEC    − .0205*  (.0111)    
LEFT       .0044  (.0106)    
COAL       .0649***  (.0174)    
SAMECOAL    − .0656***  (.0182)    
PREELEC*SPD      − .0198  (.0229)  
PREELEC*SPDFDP      − .0325  (.0259)  
PREELEC*SPDGR      − .0074  (.0407)  
PREELEC*GRANDC         .0230  (.0476)  
PREELEC*CDU      − .0312  (.0217)  
PREELEC*CDUFDP      − .0226  (.0251)  
PREELEC*ELSE         .0188  (.0443)  
SPD      − .0065  (.0174)  
SPDFDP         .0139  (.0185)  
SPDGR         .0013  (.0241)  
GRANDC         .0112  (.0319)  
CDUFDP         .0171  (.0189)  
ELSE      − .0117  (.0314)  
Dependent variable DEFICIT, 430N = , standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10,  
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Table 5: Regression results for alternate election year cut-offs 
 
Variable Dec 31   Jan 31 Feb 28/29 Mar 31 Jun 30   
DEFICIT(-1)      .3581*** (.0463)      .3574*** (.0469)      .3572*** (.0470)      .3578*** (.0470)      .3631*** (.0465)   
GDP  − .3659** (.1485)  − .3698** (.1588)  − .3714** (.1586)  − .3699** (.1587)  − .3608** (.1590)   
INTRATE  − .0924 (.3985)  − .0670  (.3770)  − .0541  (.3781)  − .0969  (.3702)  − .0606  (.3714)   
OIL1      .1991***  (.0265)      .1993***  (.0240)      .1990***  (.0239)      .1991*** (.0237)      .1968***  (.0234)   
OIL2      .0438***  (.0168)      .0437***  (.0168)      .0435**  (.0168)      .0448*** (.0168)      .0436***  (.0167)   
UNIFIC  − .0177 (.0213)  − .0183 (.0209)  − .0180  (.0209)  − .0166  (.0208)  − .0193  (.0209)   
EQUAL      .0077 (.0317)      .0065  (.0279)      .0088  (.0281)      .0019  (.0281)      .0001  (.0277)   
BAILOUT  − .0268 (.0343)  − .0249  (.0316)  − .0275  (.0317)  − .0226  (.0317)  − .0179  (.0317)   
BAILOUTHB  − .0673* (.0376)  − .0707* (.0417)  − .0705*  (.0417)  − .0707*  (.0417)  − .0725*  (.0415)   
BAILOUTSL  − .0706* (.0364)  − .0770** (.0364)  − .0767**  (.0364)  − .0765**  (.0364)  − .0738**  (.0362)   
ELECTION  − .0009 (.0112)  − .0023  (.0121)  − .0017  (.0118)  − .0068  (.0101)  − .0215**  (.0100)   
PREELEC  − .0205 (.0111)  − .0231** (.0108)  − .0221**  (.0107)  − .0194**  (.0098)  − .0273***  (.0104)   
LEFT      .0044  (.0106)      .0037  (.0135)      .0038  (.0134)      .0040  (.0135)      .0034  (.0133)   
COAL      .0649*** (.0174)      .0652*** (.0167)      .0654***  (.0168)      .0653*** (.0168)      .0652***  (.0167)   
SAMECOAL  − .0656*** (.0182)  − .0659*** (.0203)  − .0658***  (.0203)  − .0657*** (.0203)  − .0648***  (.0201)   
Dependent variable DEFICIT, N = 430, standard errors in brackets.   
Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.  
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Response to the referee 
 
We thank you very much for your excellent report that helped us to improve the paper 
considerably. We completely agree that our main result is on coalition governments and the 
role (strength) of the finance minister therein. In the revised version we highlight these 
aspects – including a corresponding addition to the title of the paper.  
 
 
Answers to your comments (page numbers refer to revised version) 
 
1. Strength of the finance minister is central result of the paper. 
 
As already mentioned above we fully agree that the role of the finance minister within 
coalition governments is the most novel result of the paper. In response to your comment we 
changed the title of the paper by adding the subtitle “Weak governments meet strong finance 
ministers”. We thereby highlight, that one has to consider the strength of the finance minister 
when testing the weak government hypothesis – one cannot analyse these two aspects 
separately. 
 
To some extend the new title also previews our main result: strong finance ministers solve the 
common pool problem of coalition governments, that is, coalition governments with a strong 
finance minister borrow like single party governments. To emphasize this we have 
reorganized abstract and introduction and now discuss these issues first. The ‘centralization 
hypothesis’ going back to von Hagen (1992), von Hagen and Harden (1995), and Hallerberg 
and von Hagen (1999) is made more explicit (p. 3). 
 
The presentation of the four hypotheses in Section 3 and the presentation of results in Section 
5 are still in the same order as in the original manuscript. We decided not to present the 
coalition and finance minister arguments first since the opportunistic and partisan incentives 
are equally relevant for coalition governments and single party governments. The ordering is, 
thus, logically consistent (p. 9). In the new Subsection 3.4 we now discuss the importance of 
the finance minister in a coalition cabinet in more detail. This includes a brief discussion on 
the difficulty to measure the strength of a finance minister (thanks for bringing the recent 
paper by Wehner (2009) to our attention) and an argument for why we believe we came with 
a promising proxy (pp. 13-14). 
 
In the results section (Section 5) the position of the finance minister is now discussed in a 
separate subsection (Subsection 5.4). This is done to increase visibility of our central result. 
The presentation is clearer and a bit more detailed than before (p. 24). The conclusion is 
rewritten for the same purpose (pp. 24-25). 
 
 
2. Use real values instead of nominal ones. 
 
Again, we agree. We replaced nominal debt growth and nominal GDP growth with the 
respective real growth rates. This leads to some minor (and negligible) changes of results. 
Some coefficients of the control variables show changes (interest rate and GDP) but none of 
those effects is of prime interest to us. The coalition effect and the effect of a strong finance 
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minister within coalition governments are unchanged – debt growth is about 6 percentage 
points higher when coalitions have a weak finance minister and there is no coalition effect 
when the finance minister is strong. This result is thus independent of how debt and GDP 
growth are measured. The pre-election effect got somewhat weaker and smaller. While we 
had significance at the 5 per cent level with nominal values we now have a 10 per cent 
significance level (Tables 4 and 5). We take account of that (minor) change by referring to the 
pre-election effect now as weak evidence for opportunistic behaviour (abstract, p. 3, p. 25, 
footnote 26). 
 
 
3. Anticipated bailout and borrowing incentives 
 
Many thanks for suggesting alternative codes of the bailout variable. Saarland and Bremen 
were bailed out by the federal government in 1994 but it may be that – in anticipation of the 
bailout – borrowing incentives changed prior to 1994. Given that the constitutional court ruled 
in favour of this bailout already in 1992 it makes perfect sense to also consider the lags of the 
variable as you suggested. We constructed two dummy variables: a 1993 bailout variable and 
a 1992 bailout variable. A comparison of estimation result reveals (Models 2 to 4 in Table 4) 
that our results are robust to changes in bailout codes. Moreover, the bailout effect is never 
distinguishable from zero so that we conclude that borrowing incentives were not altered by 
the possibility of a federal bailout. We briefly discuss this on p. 20. 
 
Note that, in contrast to the previous version, we now discuss the bailout effects in the context 
of Model 2, that is, in the context of a regression with political variables. To do that within a 
model with control variables only appears to be inappropriate since the bailout effect in 
Bremen is substantial in Model 2 but not existent in Model 1. This suggests that BAILHB 
coefficient is biased in Model 1. 
 
 
4. Shorten the paper 
 
We followed your suggestions and deleted the descriptive parts from the results section (pp. 
20-24) and reduced policy implications to the strong finance minister effect in coalition 
governments (p. 25). 
 
 
Minor points: 
 
Thanks for sharing the Geys (2007) reference with us. We refer to it at several places: 
government fragmentation matters (pp. 3, 4), debt growth rates as dependent variable (p. 14). 
We also added the paper to Table 1 where we review the empirical literature. 
 
As suggested in Geys (2007) the number of parties within a coalition government may be 
important for results. In order to test whether or not coalition size is important we distinguish 
between two-party coalitions and three-party coalitions (there never was a coalition with more 
than three parties). Estimation results are reported in Table 4, Model 5. The results suggest 
that there is no effect of coalition size (the COAL3 coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero and the COAL2 effect is unchanged as compared to the coalition effect reported in 
Model 2). One should note, however, that we effectively only have 9 observations with three-
party coalitions. We briefly discuss this on p. 23. 
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We are happy that you appreciate our efforts to make the empirical methodology and model 
selection transparent. Accordingly, Section 4 is unchanged. 
 
 
Other changes: 
 
In the previous version of the paper we used the calendar year to determine election and pre-
election years. We argued that the choice of the cut-off date (December 31) is largely 
arbitrary and demonstrated that our results were robust to changes in the cut-off (Table 5). In 
the current version of the paper Table 5 shows that this robustness result still holds with real 
growth rates. So, in principle, it would have been possible to stick with the December cut-off. 
But we decided not to for reasons discussed in the paper: “So far we have been silent about 
how the variables ELECTION and PREELEC are defined. Using the calendar year (cut-off is 
December 31) seems to be natural but only at a first sight. We want the pre-election variable 
to pick-up the incentives described in Rogoff and Sibert (1988). But then information on debt 
in the pre-election year must be readily available when elections actually take place. Since 
this is highly unlikely for elections held in January, the cut-off January 31 appears more 
plausible than December 31. A similar argument can be made about elections held in 
February and March so that we opted for March 31 as cut-off for Models 2 to 6 in Table 4. 
Although it seems plausible to deviate from the calendar year, the actual choice of a cut-off 
date is largely arbitrary. As Table 5 shows our results are robust to changes in cut-offs” (p. 
21). 
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The political economy of the German Länder deficits: 
Weak governments meet strong finance ministers 
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May 8, 2009  
 
Abstract  
 
We analyze the deficits of the German Länder (regional states) for the period from 1960 to 
2005 and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy of 
public deficits. We find evidence for the weak government hypothesis, that is, coalition 
governments issue significantly more debt than single party governments – a result that is 
typically explained by the common pool problem. As our data suggest, this result crucially 
hinges on the position or strength of the finance minister within coalition governments. We 
find that coalition governments with a strong finance minister are – in terms of borrowing – 
not significantly different from single party governments.. In addition we find (weak) 
evidence for an opportunistic political business cycle. As borrowing is significantly lower in 
pre-election years it appears that German voters favor fiscal discipline. There is no evidence 
for partisan behavior; so, party ideology seems to play a negligible role.   
 
Keywords: Public Debt, German Länder, Political Economy, Weak Governments, Strong 
Finance Ministers.   
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1. Introduction 
Public deficits vary widely between jurisdictions. It is broadly accepted that economic 
variables such as economic growth or the interest rate alone cannot explain these differences. 
In fact, political variables and political institutions play an important role in the development 
of public debt (Persson and Tabellini, 1997). When comparing different countries, however, 
one can hardly disentangle the effect of political variables and the impact of political 
institutions. This identification problem disappears when the influence of political variables 
on public debt in the German states (Länder) is analyzed as the jurisdictions have almost 
identical political institutions and electoral rules. However, they differ quite substantially in 
other dimensions such as fiscal policy outcomes and per capita income. Thus, our data set 
offers a promising opportunity to solely test for the influence of political variables on public 
deficits.  
 
We test a number of hypotheses taken from the theoretical literature on the political economy 
of debt issue. Most importantly, we address the weak government hypothesis: the common 
pool problem suggests that coalition governments can be expected to issue significantly more 
debt than single-party governments. Political fragmentation received considerable attention in 
the literature but results give no clear picture. Roubini and Sachs (1989) find support for the 
weak government hypothesis. Re-estimating the Roubini and Sachs model, Edin and Ohlsson 
(1991) challenge their view and argue that the coalition effect identified in Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) is a result of minority governments rather than political fragmentation. Using a 
different data set, de Haan and Sturm (1997) find no coalition effects – neither with the 
dispersion index used by Roubini and Sachs nor with the one used by Edin and Ohlsson. In a 
recent study on debt of the Flemish municipalities, Ashworth, Geys and Heyndels (2005) find 
that political fragmentation affects local indebtedness in the short but not in the long run. 
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 3 
Using the same data set Geys (2007) demonstrated that the level of fragmentation (number of 
parties forming the coalition government) may contribute to explaining political outcomes. 
 
To what extent the common pool problem actually translates into higher debt (if at all) also 
depends on the degree of centralization of fiscal policy. A strong position of the finance 
minister within the cabinet may result in lower deficits (see von Hagen, 1992; Hagen and 
Harden (1995), Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999). To the best of our knowledge there is no 
study that explicitly addressed this issue. We fill this gap by distinguishing coalition 
governments with a strong finance minister form those with weak a finance minister.  
 
For completeness we also test for opportunistic behavior and partisan politics. The 
opportunistic school suggests that political behavior is solely designed to win the next 
election. Empirical evidence is mixed. Nordhaus (1975) finds evidence for opportunistic 
cycles for two out of four elections in the United States. Easaw and Garratt (2000) report that 
expenditures of conservative UK governments are more responsive to national income in pre-
election periods. Galli and Rossi (2002) find only weak support for the opportunistic school. 
Evidence for partisan politics, where policy is primarily driven by party ideology, is also 
mixed. Alesina (1989), Boix (2000), Cusack (1997), Hibbs (1977), Reed (2006) and, Tavares 
(2004), for example, find support for the partisan theory. Carlsen (1997) only observes 
evidence for partisan politics when unemployment is high or rising, whereas Heckelman 
(2002), Seitz (2000), and Galli and Rossi (2002), for instance, find no evidence for it.3 In a 
recent study by Andrikopoulos et al. (2006) on European Union data evidence for both, 
opportunistic cycles and partisan behavior is lacking.  
 
We estimate a dynamic panel data model and find evidence for the weak government 
                                                 
3Table 1 in the Appendix offers a more detailed (but still partial) review of the empirical literature related to our 
study. 
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hypothesis, that is, coalition governments issue significantly more debt than single-party 
governments. This result, however, only applies to coalition governments with a weak finance 
minister. The coalition effect vanishes when the finance minister is strong4: borrowing of 
single party governments is not statistically different from borrowing of coalition 
governments with a strong finance minister. In contrast to Geys (2007) the number of parties 
in a coalition government (coalition size) is irrelevant – a result that is likely to be due to 
insufficient variation in coalition size in our sample. There is some evidence for opportunistic 
behavior: debt issue is significantly lower in pre-election years. Thus, German voters seem to 
favor fiscal discipline or, at least, the incumbent may believe they do. There is no evidence for 
partisan behavior.  
 
The first econometric study with German data that considers political variables as covariates 
is Frey and Schneider (1979). The current paper, however, is most related to Seitz (2000) and 
Galli and Rossi (2002) who also analyze the political economy of German Länder fiscal 
policy. Seitz considers the time period from 1976 to 1996 whereas Galli and Rossi analyze the 
period from 1974 to 1994. While Seitz concentrates on partisan politics and deficit data, Galli 
and Rossi are more ambitious and additionally test for political business cycles using deficits, 
expenditures and expenditure categories. We extend these two studies along three lines. First, 
we explicitly address the role of coalition governments and the position of the finance 
minister therein and thereby gain a number of new insights (finance minister weakness is a 
prerequisite for the weak government hypothesis to hold.) Second, due to the availability of 
better estimation methods, we also econometrically go beyond Seitz and Galli and Rossi. 
Seitz only applies the least squares dummy variable estimator. As this estimator may be 
severely biased in short panels we use the bias corrected least squares dummy variable 
estimator that clearly outperforms the uncorrected version (see, e.g., Bruno, 2005). Galli and 
                                                 
4
 We consider a finance minister to be strong when he or she has the same party affiliation as the prime minister. 
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 5 
Rossi deal with heteroscedasticity but also ignore the bias. Finally, we use data from 1960 to 
2005 and thereby extend the analysis from 21 to 46 years. Note that this extension is crucial 
since all three studies rely on within state variation to tease out statistically significant 
covariates.5  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the institutional background for Germany is 
provided. The hypotheses to be tested are derived in Section 3. We thereby review the 
theoretical literature on the political economy of debt issue. The empirical model and the 
different estimators applied are introduced in Section 4. The data set and the results are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Institutional background 
1. Germany’s federal political design 
The name “Federal Republic of Germany” (FRG) already highlights the country’s federal 
structure that is reflected by the levels of government: federal (Bund), state (Land) and local 
(Gemeinde). Since German unification in 1990 Germany consists of sixteen Länder, the ten 
Länder of former West Germany, the five new Länder of former East Germany (German 
Democratic Republic, GDR), and Berlin. From World War II to unification, Berlin was 
divided into West Berlin and East Berlin, where the latter was the capital of the GDR. 
Additionally, there are about 14,000 cities and communities, which form the local level (Seitz, 
2000, p. 188).  
 
The Länder are not mere provinces, they are states endowed with their own powers. These 
powers and responsibilities are specified in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Germany’s 
                                                 
5We ran our empirical models on shorter time periods, including those used in Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi 
(2002) and largely lose significance. In other words, the differences in results between our paper and the other 
two are mainly due to the much longer time period that we consider. 
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 6 
constitution. The Basic Law also guarantees the local authorities the right to independently 
administer their own affairs. As the local authorities rely heavily on grants from the states, 
their independence is rather limited. Three large German cities, namely, Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg, form their own states (Länder). These are the so-called “city-states” (Stadtstaaten) 
that do not have local administrative bodies. In contrast, the other German states are called 
“non-city-states” (Flächenländer). This distinction is important since the budgets of the city-
states include expenditures and revenues that are part of the local budgets in non-city-states. 
Moreover, the expenditures of the non-city-states include grants to the local authorities 
whereas there are no such grants to local authorities in the city-states. Consequently, public 
expenditures or public debt of the two types of states are not directly comparable.6  
 
Our study examines the budget deficits of the Länder without taking the local authorities into 
account. As mentioned above, local authorities have their own budgets and their own 
parliaments. Election dates typically differ between local and state jurisdictions. As a 
consequence, the aggregated local political structure will hardly ever match the political 
structure of the state. Since the state government cannot be held responsible for deficits at the 
local level (net of state grants) it is logically consistent to concentrate on state level debt and 
neglect deficits arising at the local level.7  
 
2. Fiscal federalism in Germany 
Although the Länder are endowed with theirs own powers, an almost total lack of tax setting 
autonomy exists. Additionally, a large fiscal equalization system harmonizes revenues across 
states, calculated on the basis of several fiscal and economic indicators, and this strongly 
distorts incentives to increase the tax base. The situation in Germany, therefore, differs in one 
                                                 
6In our empirical model, state fixed effects account for that fundamental difference as well as for other time 
invariant state characteristics. 
7For the same reason, the other two papers analyzing fiscal variables of the German states, namely, Seitz (2000) 
and Galli and Rossi (2002), also concentrate on data at the state level. 
Page 41 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 7 
major aspect from the theoretical literature on the political economy of public expenditures: 
typically the government has two options for financing expenditures – taxes and debt. But, 
due to the lack of tax setting autonomy and the equalization scheme, total revenue of every 
Land is more or less fixed (for a more detailed overview see Seitz, 2000, pp. 188-190). To 
finance public expenditures, Länder governments only have one discretionary source of 
financing at their disposal, namely debt. We therefore concentrate on public debt and their 
political determinants.  
 
There are two more important aspects: First, in 1990, the five new Länder of former East 
Germany and East Berlin joined the FRG, enlarging the population from around 64 million to 
roughly 80 million, while the GDP only increased by less than 10 per cent. The integration of 
East Germany into the West German social security system, the huge investments in 
infrastructure and various other costs of transformation created a substantial fiscal shock. 
Although during the first five years after unification most of the direct financial burden was 
borne by the federal government (via the so-called unification fund, Fonds Deutsche Einheit), 
we control for unification in our empirical analysis. Secondly, from 1995 onwards, the new 
German Länder, i.e., former East Germany, and Berlin were included in the fiscal 
equalization system. A large part of this equalization is amongst the Länder (horizontal 
equalization). As the new participants were net recipients, this introduced a fiscal burden on 
the Western Länder, an effect that we account for in our analysis.  
 
Finally, two German states, namely Bremen and Saarland, were bailed out by the federal 
government. From 1994 onwards they received transfers over and above those of the fiscal 
equalization scheme. This bailout is likely to reduce debt issue in both states. Moreover, one 
could imagine that the occurrence of a federal bailout alters the incentives of the states to 
issue debt in general. Our empirical model considers all these aspects.  
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3. Political parties 
In Germany, there are four major parties. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Green party (GREEN). 
While CDU, SPD and FDP ran for elections in the entire period under study here, the Greens 
did not. The Green party was founded in 1980 and first won parliamentary seats at the state 
level in Hamburg and Hesse in 1982 and at the federal level in 1983. Due to historical 
developments after World War II, the CDU has never run for elections in Bavaria. Instead 
their so-called sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), participates. The programs of 
CDU and CSU, however, are very similar and they always form one parliamentary group in 
the federal parliament (Bundestag). Therefore, we do not distinguish between them and label 
both CDU.  
 
After unification, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was founded, a successor to the 
United Socialist Party (SED), the party that ruled East Germany for more than 40 years. 
Although the PDS has significant influence in the new Länder, it has not succeeded in gaining 
any influence in the Western Länder.8,9 As the democratic history of the East German states is 
rather short, we abstain from including them in our analysis. Due to its special status, Berlin is 
also eliminated from the data set (see below for more details).  
 
Since 1960 the West German Länder have either been governed by majority governments of 
the CDU or SPD or by a coalition that mostly consisted of two parties. The SPD has formed 
coalitions with all three other parties, whereas the CDU has only formed coalitions with the 
SPD (a so-called ‘grand coalition’) or the FDP. Minority governments as well as other 
                                                 
8In 2007 the PDS merged with the WASG. The latter largely consisted of disappointed former social democrats 
and union members. The so-formed new party, DIE LINKE, is about to gain influence in West-German states. 
9To some extent, Berlin is an exception as the SPD currently forms a coalition with the DIE LINKE. Note, 
however, that today’s Berlin is not a former Western Land. 
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government constellations have played a negligible role. Table 3 in the Appendix provides, 
among other things, an overview of government formations in the West German states.10  
 
3. The political economy of public deficits 
There is a large number of conflicting theories explaining the formation and the evolution of 
public deficits. In this section we review (part of) the theoretical literature and derive the 
hypotheses to be tested in Section 5. Our focus is on four theories, namely, government 
fragmentation (weak governments), ‘centralization’ of fiscal policy (strength of the finance 
minister), political opportunism, and partisan theory. Since the motives formulated in the 
latter two theories are equally relevant for single-party governments and coalition 
governments it is logically consistent to start this section with political opportunism and 
partisan theory followed by the peculiarities of coalition governments and their finance 
ministers. 
 
1. Political opportunism 
Opportunistic governments are assumed to be primarily interested in being reelected. There 
are no ideological motives. Although originally introduced in the context of the ‘Phillips 
curve’ (see Nordhaus, 1975; MacRae, 1977), Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that the theory of political opportunism can also be applied to 
public deficits: to appear competent to voters, the government has an incentive to boost the 
economy thereby improving the chances of being reelected. Such policies mostly require 
raising transfers or increasing public investments (e.g., infrastructure, housing, and hospitals). 
As German states are hardly able to influence their returns, the augmented public expenditure 
                                                 
10For an explanation of the variables see Table 2 in the Appendix. 
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will result in (further) debt, especially in election years.11  
 
This strategy only works if voters do not (fully) anticipate that the debt burden must be borne 
after the election. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) demonstrated, however, that opportunistic cycles 
may also occur under rational expectations. They developed a theory where opportunistic 
cycles originate in temporary information asymmetries between government and voters. The 
government tries to exploit its information advantage by running low deficits; this signals that 
the government can provide a given level of public goods reasonably efficiently. Since 
deficits are visible to voters with a time lag, low deficits are expected to occur in pre-election 
years.  
 
The main idea behind rational opportunistic cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) is the same as 
behind opportunistic cycles of the Nordhaus type: in order to win the upcoming election, the 
government is prepared to introduce distorted policies. In the former case this leads to lower 
deficits in pre-election years and, in the latter case, to higher deficits in election and possibly 
pre-election years. Without any time pattern in deficits around elections there is no evidence 
for opportunistic cycles.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Public deficits in pre-election years and in election years are no different than 
in all other years.  
 
Consider that a government can be sure of being reelected. In the German case, Bavaria 
serves as an example, where the CSU has been in office since the 1950s. Without any risk of 
being thrown out of office, there is no incentive to introduce distorted policies. Thus, finding 
no evidence for political opportunism may simply reflect political stability.  
                                                 
11Of course, one may argue that if the election is early in the year expenditures should raise in the pre-election 
year. We discuss this in some detail in Section 5.1. 
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2. Partisan theory 
Partisan theory suggests that government politics are primarily driven by ideological motives 
and, accordingly, predicts a more expansionary policy for left governments than for right 
governments. Left governments, for instance, are typically more inclined to favor 
redistributive policies. Public spending may therefore be directed towards mitigating income 
inequality by increasing transfers. With fixed returns, as in our case, such programs may 
require debt issue. In short, partisan theory suggests that if left governments are in office then 
debt issue will be higher than otherwise. To actually identify partisan effects, ideology of 
competing parties must be sufficiently different and ideally time invariant – and this is exactly 
what was traditionally assumed (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977).  
 
It may be a bit naive to claim that a party’s policy is solely driven by ideology; parties also 
care about winning the next election. But then the policies of two competing parties will 
converge unless voters are irrational or at least one party has a sufficiently low discount factor 
(Alesina, 1988). Since policy convergence precludes identification of partisan effects a closer 
look at this topic is warranted.  
 
Consider a two-party system where both parties, right and left, are equally well informed and 
both care about winning elections. In electoral competition both parties will adopt the same 
platform – the one that maximizes the probability of being elected. If parties are not 
committed to their platform then, once elected, they implement their most favored policy. 
Irrational voters will not anticipate the parties’ incentives to deviate from their platform and 
partisan effects may result. Alesina (1988) argued that this result also holds under rational 
expectations when electoral competition is considered a one-shot game. Rational voters 
anticipate the parties’ incentive to deviate from any announced policy other than their optimal 
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policy so that the only time-consistent equilibrium must have diverging platforms.  
 
In an infinitely repeated game the ideological difference between parties may be blurred when 
a cooperative policy (that both parties agree upon prior to elections) can be supported as an 
equilibrium (see Alesina, 1988). If the elected party deviates and implements its most favored 
policy, then cooperation becomes incredible and parties end up playing their non-cooperative 
Nash strategies. Deviation is beneficial if the current gain of implementing the desired policy 
is larger than the future loss originating in the breakdown of cooperation. This is likely to be 
the case for low discount factors, a situation where reputation only plays a minor role. Note 
that sustainable cooperation precludes partisan effects even if parties’ ideologies diverge. This 
is unproblematic for testing for partisan effects since we are not trying to identify different 
ideologies but whether different ideologies find their way into fiscal policy.12 We can, 
therefore, write our second hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Deficits are independent of government ideology, that is, deficits of left 
governments are no different to deficits of right governments.  
 
3. Fragmented governments 
The theories discussed so far have modeled electoral competition between two parties that 
simultaneously aim at political power. With only two parties, there is no conflict once one 
party is elected. With more than two parties, coalition governments may arise, opening up 
another stage of conflict.  
 
In a coalition government each coalition partner tries to allocate as much of the budget as 
                                                 
12Note that we concentrate on public deficits. It may well be that there are no partisan effects in borrowing but in 
the structure of public spending (see, for instance, Drazen and Eslava, 2005). 
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possible to its constituency. Partners come up with spending proposals that are asymmetric in 
the sense that benefits primarily go to the respective constituency but costs are equally shared 
amongst coalition partners. Since costs are not fully internalized coalition governments face a 
common pool problem where too high spending proposals translate into higher budget deficits 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1997, pp. 68-71.) Since the fraction of internalized costs decreases 
with coalition size, borrowing is expected to increase with coalition size. Our next hypothesis, 
again in its null-form, can then be stated as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Borrowing is independent of how many parties form the government.  
 
4. Position of the finance minister 
An obvious criticism of the Persson/Tabellini argument from above is that all partners have 
control over some part of the budget and none of the parties is responsible for the entire 
budget. Centralization of financial responsibility would yield efficiency.13 The extent to which 
the common pool problem actually translates into higher debt, thus, depends on the degree of 
centralization of fiscal policy. Von Hagen and Harden (1995) argue that in situations where 
spending ministers independently develop their spending plans a suboptimally large budget is 
adopted. Only ministers without a sectoral budget, like the prime minister or the finance 
minister, have greater incentives to consider the overall impact of higher taxation. Like most 
politicians, finance ministers will typically care about their prestige, which is largely 
determined by their ability to form a solid budget. As a result, the interests of the finance 
minister in terms of borrowing should be well aligned with those of the ‘average’ taxpayer 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996, pp. 20-21). Hence, a strong finance minister is expected to 
mitigate the common pool problem so that borrowing is lower as compared to a cabinet with a 
                                                 
13An alternative theory that explains higher deficits for coalition governments is offered by Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1994, pp. 22-29): consider a permanent fiscal shock. Coalition partners will then 
fight about the allocation of the fiscal burden to the respective constituencies. This situation is well modeled by 
the ‘war of attrition’. In general, delayed adjustment to the fiscal shock will obtain, allowing debt to accumulate. 
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weak finance minister.  
 
That the power of the finance minister in the budget process is decisive for fiscal performance 
was analytically demonstrated by von Hagen and Harden (1995). The actual strength of the 
finance minister, however, is difficult to measure (for an excellent recent discussion see 
Wehner, 2009). We consider the following proxy: when the finance minister has the same 
party affiliation as the prime minister, the finance minister is likely to be in a strong position. 
This proxy is well in line with the argument put forward in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), 
who suggest that the finance minister must be backed up by the prime minister in order to be 
able to shape fiscal policy according to his/her (and the tax payers) preferences. If prime and 
finance minister belong to the same party then it is more likely that they share political views 
and, in turn, that the prime minister provides the necessary support to strengthen his/her 
finance minister. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The position of the finance minister in a coalition government has no impact on 
borrowing.  
 
4. Empirical model 
In recent studies of public deficits or public expenditures the variable of interest has typically 
been transformed before running regressions. Cusack (1997) and Seitz (2000), for example, 
take its first difference as a share of the GDP. This is basically done in order to obtain 
stationary time series. Like Geys (2007) we consider growth rates for the same purpose. The 
major advantage of our approach is that the GDP is not used in the construction of the 
dependent variable which could otherwise be a source of endogeneity. We consider the 
following dynamic panel data model  
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 1 1 2it i t it it i itd d x zγ β β µ ε, − ′ ′= + + + + ,  (1) 
where itd  denotes the real growth rate of public debt in state 1i N= ,...,  at time 1t T= ,...,  and 
1i td , −  its first lag, 2t T= ,..., .
14
 The political variables are summarized in the vector itx , the 
control variables in itz . We control for real GDP growth (GDP), the first and second oil crisis 
(OIL1, OIL2) as well as for German unification (UNIFIC) and for the inclusion of the East 
German states into the fiscal equalization scheme (EQUAL).15 As an identifying assumption 
we suggest that all relevant time effects are picked up by specifying a dynamic model and by 
including the additional time control variables: the oil crises dummies and the unification and 
fiscal equalization dummies. We refrain from adding time fixed effects to the model. This 
would introduce (imperfect) multi-collinearity and prevent us from testing for political 
opportunism (Hypothesis 1) where variation over time is essential.16 
 
Potential direct and indirect effects of the federal government bailout are picked up by the 
variables BAILOUT, BAILHB and BAILSL, where the latter two are interactions between 
the variables BAILOUT and the state fixed effects for Bremen (HB) and Saarland (SL), 
respectively.17 Finally, debt issue may respond to the financial costs of borrowing, namely, 
the real interest rate (INTRATE). Note that the interest rate varies over time but not over 
states. This limits the explanatory power to within state variation.  
 
The time invariant state effect is given by iµ . We will consider these effects as fixed rather 
                                                 
14Note that real debt growth is simply real deficit over real debt. 
15Definition of all variables can be found in the Appendix in Table 2. 
16
 Elections are not uniformly distributed over time. This is why year dummies are correlated with the variables 
ELECTION and PREELEC. While the ELECTION coefficient is never statistically different from zero we lose 
significance for PREELEC in a model with time fixed effects. All other results reported below are robust to this 
alternative specification. 
17One may argue that debt issue is influenced by the possibility of a federal bailout so that the bailout variables 
are endogenous. Since debt started to accumulate in the 1970s in most states, about 20 years prior to the first and 
so far only bailout, it is hard to imagine that borrowing incentives were influenced by the possibility of a bailout. 
Moreover, there is no rule or directive specifying when the federal government has to step in. There is, thus, no 
reason to believe that the corresponding variables are endogenous. 
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than random. It can be argued that there is no room for random effects as the entire 
population, i.e., all ten West German states, are included in the study. A more substantial 
argument is the existence of long-lasting governments. Bavaria, for instance, was ruled by the 
CSU for the entire period considered here. North-Rhine Westphalia is an example of almost 
continuous SPD government. Obviously we will have ( ) 0it iE x µ ≠ , i.e. state fixed effects.18 
Random disturbance is ),0(~ 2τσε Nit . Let ( )it it itw x z′ ′ ′= | , then the assumptions of the model 
can be summarized as follows 
                                                
( ) 0  for    or  
( ) 0  for all  , ,
( ) 0  for all  , , , .
it js
i jt
it js
E i j t s
E i j t
E w i j s t
ε ε
µ ε
ε
= ≠ ≠
=
=
                                              (2) 
 
As is well known, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent when a dynamic 
panel data model, like the one in equation (1), is to be estimated. The estimates of γ  will be 
biased upwards and the coefficients of the exogenous variables will be biased towards zero 
(see Hsiao, 1986, pp. 76-78). The fixed effects estimator (or Least-Squares Dummy Variable, 
LSDV, estimator) eliminates this source of inconsistency by taking account of the Länder 
fixed effects iµ . There nevertheless remains a bias, as the lagged endogenous variable is 
correlated with the transformed error term. Nickell (1981) showed that the fixed effects 
estimator for γ  may be seriously biased downwards in short panels.19  
 
Several consistent instrumental variable methods have been developed that, in general, can 
improve on the LSDV estimates. These estimators typically consider the first differenced 
version of the model described in equation (1),  
                                                 
18The Hausman test suggests that the random effects model is consistent. Note, however, that the test requires 
that the fixed effects estimator is consistent. As this is clearly violated in a dynamic model (see below) we follow 
our intuitive argument and use fixed effects. 
19He also showed, however, that the bias approaches zero as T  tends to infinity. Since T  is relatively large in 
our study ( 46T = ), the bias is likely to be moderate. Note that although T  is much smaller in Seitz (2000, 
21T = ) and Galli and Rossi (2002, 21T = ) both studies use the LSDV estimator. 
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 1 1 2it i t it it itd d x zγ β β ε, − ′ ′∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ ,  (3) 
where ∆  is the first difference operator, e.g., 1it it i td d d , −∆ = − . This transformation eliminates 
the (time invariant) fixed effects. The estimator developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982, AH 
estimator), for example, uses 2i td , −  as an instrument for 1i td , −∆  and thereby removes the 
source of the bias. The generalized method of moments estimator of Arellano and Bond 
(1991), henceforth AB estimator, uses all valid lags of the dependent variable (in levels) as 
instruments for itd∆ . The AB estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient (when N  
tends to infinity).20 Due to the larger set of instruments, AB is more efficient than AH. There 
is a homoscedastic (one-step) version of the AB estimator and a two-step version, that, by 
allowing for heteroscedasticity, may improve efficiency. Simulation studies have shown, 
however, that the two-step AB is – in most cases – less efficient than the one-step AB, i.e. the 
two-step AB yields higher standard errors (see, e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991; Kiviet, 1995; 
Judson and Owen, 1997). In principle, efficiency gains may be achievable when applying the 
system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998), henceforth BB estimator. However, both the AB and the BB estimator are micro panel 
data estimators and have poor finite sample properties. As N  is small in our study ( 10N = ), 
results of both estimators should mainly be seen as robustness checks. 
 
A more reliable estimator is the bias corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC). The bias may be 
approximated to the order of 1( )O T −  when using the approximation derived in Nickell (1981), 
1 1( )O T N− −  when using Kiviet (1995), and 1 2( )O T N− −  when using Kiviet (1999). In a 
simulation study, Bun and Kiviet (2003) show that the Kiviet (1999) approximation accounts 
for about 90 per cent of the actual bias. Several simulation studies have shown that the 
                                                 
20We consider the regressors summarized in itw  as strictly exogenous so that variables themselves and all their 
lags are valid instruments. Furthermore, note that the AB estimator takes first order autocorrelation of ε∆  into 
account. Thus, neither consistency nor efficiency is affected by first order autocorrelation. But second order 
correlation implies inconsistency (Arellano and Bond, 1991, pp. 281-282). 
Page 52 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 18 
LSDVC estimator outperforms the consistent estimators described above in terms of both bias 
and standard errors (see, e.g., Bruno, 2005 and Judson and Owen, 1997, 1999). We therefore 
use the LSDVC estimator for our analysis.  
 
To actually correct the bias one needs an initial consistent estimate of the coefficients and 
each of the three estimators AH, AB and BB may be used. As the AB estimator typically 
outperforms the AH estimator and appears more robust than the BB estimator (see Bruno, 
2005), we opt for the AB estimator and use the Kiviet (1999) bias approximation. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions.21 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
The data set comprises yearly data for 10 West German states from 1960 to 2005. In the early 
years of the FRG, i.e. before 1960, the party structure was relatively unstable. Several small 
regional parties joined state governments for short periods and disappeared afterwards. 
Additionally, different coalitions governed within one election period. As this was clearly just 
a post-war phenomenon, we do not include these years into our analysis. As already 
mentioned, Berlin and the five new German Länder have not been included in our sample. 
Berlin is excluded for two reasons. First, Berlin was divided before 1990. While East Berlin 
was the capital of the GDR, West Berlin was part of the FRG. Second, West Berlin received 
generous grants from the federal government, making debt issue more or less unnecessary. 
Data for the East German Länder are available from 1990 onwards. We nevertheless do not 
include them, as the period is simply too short to obtain sufficient (political) within state 
variation. We arrive at a balanced panel with 460 observations. The average annual real GDP 
                                                 
21The estimates with BB as initial estimator have slightly higher standard errors. Apart from that results remain 
unchanged. The complete estimates for the BB and AH estimator are available upon request. 
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growth was 2.7 per cent, whereas the average annual real debt grew with 6.5 per cent. We 
capture the costs of borrowing by the real interest rate.22 
 
Before testing the political economy of debt issue, we briefly discuss the results with 
economic indicators and some controls only (Model 1). The regression results are shown in 
the first column of Table 4 (see Appendix). With a coefficient of around .32, autoregression is 
relatively moderate. The impact of real GDP growth is, as expected, significantly negative. 
When real GDP growth drops by one percentage point debt growth gears up by roughly 0.5 
percentage points. This may be due to expenditure programs, reduced tax revenues, or both. 
While the first oil crisis, OIL1, increased debt growth significantly, the second oil crisis, 
OIL2, had no effect. German unification had a negative impact on debt growth in West 
Germany. Its insignificance may be due to the fact that most of the financial burden of 
unification was borne by the social security systems and the German unification fund and not 
by the states. Moreover, the economy boomed right after unification, increasing tax revenues. 
This may explain why no further state debt was needed. We find no significant effect of the 
inclusion of the East German Länder into the fiscal equalization system (EQUAL) on public 
debt growth. The costs of borrowing, measured by the real interest rate (INTRATE), have the 
expected negative and significant impact on debt issue. 
 
When adding political variables (Model 2) the first thing to note is that the results mentioned 
above remain qualitatively the same. The only exception is the effect of the second oil crisis 
which is now statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.23 Before we turn to the 
                                                 
22Deficit data are taken from the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office, 2005). Data for the gross 
domestic product (GDP) was provided by the Statistical Office of Baden Württemberg and the Federal Statistical 
Office. All nominal numbers were deflated by the consumer price index for all households obtained from the 
Statistisches Bundesamt (2006). Our main results do not change qualitatively when using nominal values 
instead. Election dates were taken from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2007, Election Research Team). 
23
 Some coefficients change substantially which suggests that a regression without political variables suffers 
from omitted variable bias. 
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discussion of the hypotheses formulated in Section 3, note that the federal government bailout 
helped consolidate the budgets of Saarland (BAILSL) and Bremen (BAILHB). The variable 
BAILOUT assumes the value 1 starting in 1994 and 0 otherwise. It should pick up any bailout 
related changes in states’ borrowing incentives. As the constitutional court ruled in favor of a 
federal bailout already in 1992 one may well argue that borrowing incentives may have 
changed prior to 1994. We address this issue in Models 3 and 4 where the bailout variable 
assumes the value 1 starting in 1993 and 1992, respectively. A comparison of Models 2 to 4 
shows that all results discussed in turn are robust to these alternative codes of the bailout 
variable.24 We stick to the 1994 version of the bailout variable and consider Model 2 our 
baseline specification. 
 
1. Political opportunism (Hypothesis 1) 
To test Hypothesis 1 we include two dummy variables in our regression: ELECTION and 
PREELEC. The first variable equals 1 in election years and zero otherwise, the second 
accordingly for pre-election years. Model 2 reveals that debt growth in election years is not 
significantly different from reference years. In contrast, debt growth in pre-election years is 
about 1.6 percentage points smaller than in reference years. Although the effect is statistically 
significant the magnitude appears to be small. But when relating this number to average debt 
growth, we arrive at a 25 per cent lower debt growth in pre-election years: the effect is 
substantial! We are thus able to reject Hypothesis 1: there is an opportunistic cycle that brings 
about significantly lower deficits in pre-election years. This result allows us to conclude that 
German voters seem to favor fiscal discipline.25 Although results do not allow us to 
                                                 
24Note that the 1994 bailout variable and EQUAL are highly correlated; they only differ in 1994. Even if we drop 
one of them we do not gain significance of the other. Although correlation is dampened under the alternative 
codes of the bailout variable it remains insignificant. 
25This differs from Galli and Rossi (2002) who found significantly positive election year effects but no pre-
election year effects. 
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discriminate between rational and non-rational expectations, our result is in line with the 
theory developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988).26 
 
So far we have been silent about how the variables ELECTION and PREELEC are defined. 
Using the calendar year (cut-off is December 31) seems to be natural but only at a first sight. 
We want the pre-election variable to pick-up the incentives described in Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988). But then information on debt in the pre-election year must be readily available when 
elections actually take place. Since this is highly unlikely for elections held in January, the 
cut-off January 31 appears more plausible than December 31.27 A similar argument can be 
made about elections held in February and March so that we opted for March 31 as cut-off for 
Models 2 to 6 in Table 4. Although it seems plausible to deviate from the calendar year, the 
actual choice of a cut-off date is largely arbitrary. As Table 5 shows our results are robust to 
changes in cut-offs. This robustness is very reassuring that we actually found an opportunistic 
cycle.28 The results with the June cut-off are slightly different, though. We find a significant 
negative effect for both, election and pre-election years. But this only strengthens our 
assertion that German voters seem to favor fiscal discipline. 
 
2. Partisan theory (Hypothesis 2) 
To check whether fiscal policy is driven by party ideology, we have to assign every 
government constellation to either left or right. We categorize SPD governments, SPD/FDP 
coalitions and SPD/GREEN coalitions as left. CDU governments and CDU/FDP coalitions 
                                                 
26
 Although we will eventually adopt Model 2 one should note that evidence for political opportunism is not 
overwhelming. The p-value is 9.4 per cent and only 2 of 5 specifications (Models 2 to 6) show significance at the 
10 per cent level. 
27
 So suppose the cut-off is January 31. Then an election in, say, January 1982, would have 1981 as election year 
and 1980 as pre-election year. An election in February 1982 would have 1982 as election year and 1981 as pre-
election year. 
28
 This robustness is not too surprising since there are only very few elections early in a year (8 per cent of all 
elections were held in January or February). 
Page 56 of 69
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 22 
are labeled right. It is difficult to ascribe a political orientation to grand coalitions, i.e., 
coalitions formed by SPD and CDU. There are basically two alternatives. First, do not label 
such coalitions at all and use them as a reference category in the estimation. Second, use the 
party affiliation of the prime minister to assign an orientation. We opted for the second 
alternative as 27 observations of grand coalition governments out of 460 observations are 
simply too few observations for a sensible reference category.29 A similar reasoning applies to 
all other government constellations summarized in ELSE (also 27 of 460 observations). These 
government constellations are considered left when the Social Democrats were involved and 
right when the Christian Democrats were. When the government turns over from left to right, 
or vice versa, the question of whether the government should be labeled left or right in that 
particular year becomes an issue. We consider the new government’s ideological position if 
its inaugural date was prior to July 1 of the respective year.  
 
The coefficient of LEFT is not statistically different from zero (Table 4, Model 2). So a 
significant partisan effect cannot be found. Note, however, that the coefficient obeys the 
‘correct’ sign. Although we are unable to reject Hypothesis 2 – which is well in line with 
Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002) – interpretation remains difficult (see also the 
discussion in Subsection 2). It may well be that there are no partisan trends in German Länder 
fiscal policy – that ideology plays a negligible role. This is, however, not necessarily true. 
Once parties care not only about ideology but also about winning the next election, platform 
convergence will occur. Since elections can well be considered a repeated game, parties will 
stick to their platforms. Otherwise they risk their reputation: identifying the opponent as a liar 
is a powerful weapon in electoral competition. If reputation is decisive, then platform 
convergence implies policy convergence and, with it, adaptation of fiscal policies. Differences 
can hardly be detected. And indeed, for Germany, it is usually claimed that both major parties, 
                                                 
29Results are independent of the alternative adopted. 
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SPD and CDU, are close to the center.  
 
3. Fragmented governments (Hypothesis 3) 
We define the indicator variable COAL that assumes a value of 1 whenever more than one 
party formed the government and zero otherwise.30 We find a highly significant coalition 
effect, that is, we can reject Hypothesis 3 (Table 4, Model 2). The positive sign is perfectly in 
line with the theory discussed in Section 3. Note also that if compared to the pre-election 
effect (in absolute terms), the coalition effect is about three times as high: debt growth in a 
coalition government is more than 6 percentage points higher than with single party 
governments.  
 
As argued in Section 3 the more parties forming the coalition, the more severe the common 
pool problem. To test this assertion we construct two new dummy variables, one for coalition 
governments with two parties (COAL2) and one for those with three parties (COAL3).31 The 
resulting Model 5 (Table 4 in the Appendix) reveals that coalition size appears to be 
irrelevant. This should not be too surprising, since only 15 observations have governments 
with three party coalitions. Moreover, due to using lagged gro th rates we loose six of these 
observations (three in each 1960 and 1961). 
 
Finally, one might ask whether the strategy of lower debt issue in pre-election years as 
discussed in the opportunism section is used equally across government constellations or 
whether single party governments make more use of this strategic tool than coalition 
governments. Accordingly, we construction election and pre-election interactions with the 
                                                 
30Again, in years of government changes, we use the inaugural date of the new government and July 1 as the cut-
off date to assign a value to COAL. 
31
 There never was a coalition government with more than three parties. 
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coalition variable and, as Model 6 (Table 4) shows, there is no systematic difference between 
the two.  
 
4. Position of the finance minister (Hypothesis 4) 
Hypothesis 4 states that the position of the finance minister within a coalition is irrelevant for 
a government’s borrowing decision. A strong finance minister, however, may be able to 
mitigate the common pool problem by centralizing fiscal policy (at least to some degree). As 
already argued above, a finance minister is likely to be in a strong position if he or she has the 
support of the prime minister in budget negotiations. This tends to be the case if both 
ministers have the same party affiliation and may be less so otherwise. Consequently we 
define the variable STRONG such that it assumes the value 1 whenever there is a coalition 
government where the prime minister and the finance minister belong to the same party and 
zero otherwise and consider it a proxy for the power of the finance minister.32 We find a 
statistically significant negative effect on borrowing (Table 4, Model 2), so that we conclude 
that the strength of the finance minister matters. Interestingly, this effect exactly offsets the 
coalition effect (the absolute values of the estimated coefficients of COAL and STRONG are 
not statistically distinguishable) so that coalition governments with a strong finance minister 
do not suffer from the common pool problem at all and borrow like single-party governments. 
In other words, the weak government hypothesis only holds with weak finance ministers but 
not with strong ones.  
 
6. Conclusion  
We analyzed the political determinants of the West German Länder deficits from 1960 to 
                                                 
32
 74 per cent of coalition governments have a prime minister and a finance minister belonging to the same party. 
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2005. Overall we investigated four hypotheses taken from the broad theoretical literature on 
the political economy of public expenditures and/or public debt issue, including the relatively 
new aspect of the strength of the finance minister in coalition governments. We found support 
for the weak government hypothesis – coalition governments borrow more than single party 
governments. The Hallerberg/Von Hagen thesis suggests that this kind of coordination failure 
within coalition governments may be mitigated when the finance minister is strong 
(centralization of fiscal policy). So far, the problem has been to come up with a reasonable 
measure for the strength of finance ministers. We offer a new approach and suggest that the 
finance minister can be considered strong when he or she belongs to the same party as the 
prime minister. It is then very likely that he or she receives the prime minister’s support in 
budget negotiations. Interestingly, a so defined strong finance minister is able to completely 
offset the negative effects of coalition governments on borrowing. The weak government 
hypothesis, thus, only holds when the finance minister is weak. If, in contrast, a strong finance 
minister meets a ‘weak’ government, then a coalition government borrows like a single party 
government. So when coalition governments form, economic advisers may wish to 
recommend the elected prime minister to recruit the finance minister from his or her own 
party. 
 
While we found no signs of partisan cycles in German fiscal policy there is some (weak) 
evidence for opportunistic cycles. In electoral competition, governments want to appear 
competent to voters in order to improve their chances of reelection. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
suggested that fiscal competence can be signaled via low deficits in pre-election years – 
exactly the pattern that we detected. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Literature overview 
 
Study  
 
Data  Dependent variable  Political variables & results  
Alesina (1989)  12 OECD countries 
(1966-1986)  
economic growth  
unemployment, inflation 
evidence for partisan political  
business cycles 
Alesina, Cohen 
and Roubini 
(1993)  
14 OECD countries 
(1960-1987)  
economic growth, 
unemployment,  
public expenditures, 
inflation, money supply  
evidence for rational opportunistic 
business cycles (Rogoff and Sibert) 
only for the last three dep. variables  
Alesina and Sachs 
(1988)  
United States  
(1949-1984)  
economic growth  
money supply (M1)  
evidence for partisan effects for both 
dependent variables  
 
Andrikopoulos, 
Loizides and 
Prodromidis 
(2006) 
European Union 
(1965-1997) 
economic target 
variables and tax 
instruments 
No evidence for political business 
cycles or partisan behavior 
Ashworth, Geys 
and Heyndels 
(2005)  
Flemish 
Municipalities  
(1977-2000)  
 
government debt  government fragmentation plays a 
role in the short but not in the long 
run  
Belke (2000)  Germany  
(1970-1996)  
various labor market 
variables  
evidence for short and long term 
partisan influences  
 
Boix (2000)  19 OECD countries 
(1960-1993)  
 
interest rate  
public debt  
evidence for partisan trends  
Bräuninger (2005) 19 OECD countries 
(1971-1999)  
government spending  
(general and social 
security)  
 
partisan effects in spending patterns  
Carlsen (1997) 18 OECD countries 
(1980-1992) 
 
structural deficit Partisan effects when unemployment 
is high or rising 
Cusack (1997)  16 OECD countries 
(1955-1989)  
 
general government 
spending 
evidence for partisan trends  
De Haan and 
Sturm (1997)  
 
21 OECD countries 
(1982-1992)  
public deficit  no evidence for an effect of 
government fragmentation  
Drazen and Eslava 
(2005)  
Colombian 
municipalities  
(1987-2000)  
 
government spending  
(expenditure categories)  
evidence for partisan effects, voters 
penalize incumbents for deficits 
occurring prior to elections  
 
To be continued next page 
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Study  
 
Data  Dependent variable  Political variables & results  
Easaw and Garratt 
(2000) 
 
UK Conservative 
governments 
(1979-1992) 
 
government expenditures Transfers and expenditures are 
responsive to national income in pre-
election periods 
Edin and Ohlsson 
(1991)  
 
13 OECD countries 
(1960-1985)  
public deficit  Roubini and Sachs (1989) results  
are driven by minority governments  
Galli and Rossi 
(2002)  
11 West German 
states  
(1974-1994)  
 
government expenditures 
deficits/surplus  
expenditure categories  
no partisan trends  
evidence for political business cycle 
(election years)  
Geys (2007) Flemish 
Municipalities 
(1977-2000) 
 
debt growth rate Government fragmentation (number 
of coalition partners) affects 
business cycle 
Canada (1965-1994) 
Germany (1977-
1994)  
Heckelman (2002) 
UK (1960-1993)  
 
economic growth  
unemployment  
evidence for persistent partisan 
effects,  
party popularity affects business 
cycle  
Heckelman (2006) 7 OECD countries  
(1960-1993)  
unemployment  almost no evidence for partisan 
effects  
(except US for democrat victories)  
 
Hibbs (1977)  12 OECD countries 
(1945-1969)  
 
unemployment  
inflation  
evidence for partisan effects  
Nordhaus (1975)  9 OECD countries  
(1947-1972)  
 
unemployment  evidence for opportunistic political 
business cycles  
Reed (2006)  United States, 45 
states  
(1960-2000)  
 
tax burden  evidence for partisan effects (higher 
tax burden with democrat 
governments)  
Roubini and Sachs 
(1989)  
13 OECD countries 
(1960-1985)  
public deficit  coalition governments run higher 
deficits than single party 
governments  
 
Seitz (2000)  10 West German 
states  
(1976-1996)  
expenditures, deficits and 
alternative economic 
variables  
no evidence for partisan effects  
Tavares (2004)  19 OECD countries 
(1960-1995)  
tax revenue  
public expenditures  
evidence for partisan effects  
(left: higher tax revenue,  
right: lower spending)  
 
Veiga and Veiga 
(2007)  
278 Portuguese 
municipalities  
(1979-2001)  
 
debt, tax revenue, public 
expenditures and others  
evidence for opportunistic political 
business cycles (pre-election effects) 
Wehner (2009) 60 countries 
(1975-1998) 
public deficits and 
expenditures 
number of spending ministers 
influence budget deficits and 
expenditures 
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Table 2: Explanation of variables 
 
Variable Explanation 
DEBT  real debt growth rate  
DEBT(-1)  lagged real debt growth rate  
GDP  real growth rate of gross domestic product  
INTRATE  real interest rate  
OIL1  = 1 from 1974 to 1975 (first oil crisis)  
OIL2  = 1 from 1978 to 1981 (second oil crisis)  
UNIFIC  = 1 from 1991 to 2005 (unification)  
EQUAL  = 1 from 1995 to 2005 (equalization scheme)  
BAILOUT  = 1 from 1994 to 2005 (federal government bailout)  
BAILHB  = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Bremen (Bailout-Bremen interaction)  
BAILSL  = 1 if BAILOUT = 1 and Saarland (Bailout-Saarland interaction)  
ELECTION  = 1 in election years  
PREELEC  = 1 in pre-election years  
LEFT  = 1 for SPD dominated governments  
RIGHT  = 1 for CDU dominated governments  
SPD  = 1 for single-party Social Democratic governments  
CDU  = 1 for single-party Christian Democratic governments  
SPDFDP  = 1 for SPD coalitions with Liberals  
SPDGREEN  = 1 for SPD coalitions with Greens  
GRANDC  = 1 for SPD coalitions with the CDU or vice versa  
SPDCDU  = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and SPD prime minister  
CDUSPD  = 1 for GRANDC = 1 and CDU prime minister  
CDUFDP  = 1 for CDU coalitions with Liberals  
ELSE  = 1 for remaining government constellations  
COAL  = 1 for coalition governments  
COAL2 = 1 for coalition governments with two parties 
COAL3 = 1 for coalition governments with three parties 
ELECCOAL = ELECTION * COAL 
PRECOAL = PREELEC * COAL 
STRONG  = 1 if prime and finance minister belong to the same party in a coalition 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N  mean  s.d.  min  max  
DEBT  450 0.0648 0.1078 -0.1760 1.2014 
GDP  450 0.0275 0.0333 -0.0476 0.1478 
INTRATE  460 0.0407 0.0162 0.0112 0.0790 
SPD  460 0.2043 0.4037 0 1 
SPDFDP  460 0.1587 0.3658 0 1 
SPDGREEN  460 0.0783 0.2689 0 1 
SPDCDU  460 0.0348 0.1834 0 1 
CDU  460 0.2739 0.4465 0 1 
CDUSPD  460 0.0239 0.1529 0 1 
CDUFDP  460 0.1696 0.3757 0 1 
ELSE  460 0.0565 0.2312 0 1 
GRANDC  460 0.0587 0.2353 0 1 
DEBT * ELECTION  110 0.0718 0.1103 -0.0953 0.8687 
DEBT * PREELEC  111 0.0480 0.0896 -0.1760 0.3536 
LEFT  460 0.5130 0.5004 0 1 
RIGHT  460 0.4870 0.5004 0 1 
DEBT * LEFT  232 0.0633 0.0962 -0.1049 0.8687 
DEBT * RIGHT  218 0.0665 0.1191 -0.1760 1.2014 
COAL  460 0.5217 0.5001 0 1 
COAL2 460 0.4891 0.5004 0 1 
COAL3 460 0.0326 0.1778 0 1 
DEBT * COAL  231 0.0657 0.1317 -0.1760 1.2014 
DEBT * (1−COAL)  219 0.0639 0.0749 -0.0869 0.3927 
DEBT * STRONG  172 0.0585 0.1034 -0.1760 0.8687 
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Table 4: Regression results. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. 
DEBT(-1) 0.3180 *** 0.0489 0.3134 *** 0.0483 0.3090 *** 0.0483 0.3064 *** 0.0480 0.3030 *** 0.0480 0.3130 *** 0.0485 
GDP -0.5133 *** 0.1608 -0.5842 *** 0.1599 -0.6507 *** 0.1680 -0.6946 *** 0.1927 -0.6071 *** 0.1585 -0.5815 *** 0.1602 
INTRATE -1.0892 *** 0.3568 -0.8833 ** 0.3570 -0.9172 *** 0.3498 -0.8219 ** 0.3499 -0.9519 *** 0.3544 -0.8756 ** 0.3562 
OIL1 0.1449 *** 0.0225 0.1515 *** 0.0226 0.1490 *** 0.0230 0.1462 *** 0.0232 0.1503 *** 0.0225 0.1510 *** 0.0230 
OIL2 0.0185  0.0166 0.0275 * 0.0163 0.0265  0.0164 0.0247  0.0166 0.0272 * 0.0162 0.0273 * 0.0165 
UNIFIC -0.0101  0.0194 -0.0075  0.0197 0.0056  0.0227 0.0234  0.0341 -0.0022  0.0203 -0.0080  0.0195 
EQUAL 0.0046  0.0270 -0.0017  0.0267 -0.0062  0.0237 -0.0112  0.0222 -0.0088  0.0274 -0.0019  0.0268 
BAILOUT -0.0436  0.0300 -0.0313  0.0302 -0.0429  0.0298 -0.0560  0.0414 -0.0318  0.0301 -0.0305  0.0303 
BAILHB -0.0248  0.0394 -0.0693 * 0.0396 -0.0699 * 0.0396 -0.0714 * 0.0393 -0.0694 * 0.0395 -0.0693 * 0.0398 
BAILSL -0.0789 ** 0.0328 -0.0796 ** 0.0347 -0.0796 ** 0.0343 -0.0798 ** 0.0340 -0.0783 ** 0.0346 -0.0796 ** 0.0347 
ELECTION      -0.0028  0.0098 -0.0029  0.0097 -0.0034  0.0097 -0.0028  0.0098 -0.0030  0.0119 
PREELEC      -0.0157 * 0.0094 -0.0152  0.0096 -0.0159 * 0.0093 -0.0144  0.0093 -0.0142  0.0109 
LEFT      0.0064  0.0129 0.0067  0.0129 0.0066  0.0129 0.0039  0.0129 0.0062  0.0129 
COAL      0.0631 *** 0.0159 0.0640 *** 0.0159 0.0656 *** 0.0159      0.0633 *** 0.0158 
STRONG    -0.0641 *** 0.0193 -0.0645 *** 0.0192 -0.0652 *** 0.0191 -0.0639 *** 0.0192 -0.0639 *** 0.0192 
COAL2                     0.0662 *** 0.0159      
COAL3                     0.0030  0.0350      
ELECCOAL                          0.0030  0.0155 
PRECOAL                               -0.0040   0.0175 
Notes: Dependent variable is DEBT, N = 430. Significance levels: *** =0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. 
Baseline model (Model 2) has BAILOUT = 1 for all years starting in 1994, Model 3 starting in 1993, Model 4 starting in 1992. 
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Table 5: Regression results for alternate cut-off dates for election and pre-election years. 
 December 31 January 31 February 28/29 March 31 June 30 
  coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. coeff.   s.e. 
DEBT(-1) 0.3143 *** 0.0484 0.3138 *** 0.0483 0.3135 *** 0.0483 0.3134 *** 0.0483 0.3185 *** 0.0479 
GDP -0.5811 *** 0.1582 -0.5843 *** 0.1591 -0.5848 *** 0.1588 -0.5842 *** 0.1599 -0.5782 *** 0.1590 
INTRATE -0.8350 ** 0.3796 -0.8580 ** 0.3635 -0.8468 ** 0.3641 -0.8833 ** 0.3570 -0.8366 ** 0.3574 
OIL1 0.1507 *** 0.0267 0.1513 *** 0.0228 0.1511 *** 0.0228 0.1515 *** 0.0226 0.1497 *** 0.0223 
OIL2 0.0264  0.0162 0.0266  0.0163 0.0264  0.0163 0.0275 * 0.0163 0.0265  0.0162 
UNIFIC -0.0101  0.0201 -0.0088  0.0198 -0.0085  0.0198 -0.0075  0.0197 -0.0102  0.0198 
EQUAL 0.0025  0.0301 0.0022  0.0265 0.0043  0.0267 -0.0017  0.0267 -0.0038  0.0263 
BAILOUT -0.0340  0.0327 -0.0333  0.0301 -0.0357  0.0302 -0.0313  0.0302 -0.0266  0.0301 
BAILHB -0.0658 * 0.0358 -0.0694 * 0.0396 -0.0692 * 0.0396 -0.0693 * 0.0396 -0.0709 * 0.0395 
BAILSL -0.0728 ** 0.0346 -0.0799 ** 0.0346 -0.0796 ** 0.0347 -0.0796 ** 0.0347 -0.0769 ** 0.0345 
ELECTION 0.0031  0.0106 0.0020  0.0116 0.0019  0.0113 -0.0028  0.0098 -0.0178 * 0.0096 
PREELEC -0.0164  0.0105 -0.0185 * 0.0104 -0.0177 * 0.0102 -0.0157 * 0.0094 -0.0259 *** 0.0099 
LEFT 0.0080  0.0101 0.0062  0.0129 0.0061  0.0128 0.0064  0.0129 0.0058  0.0127 
COAL 0.0633 *** 0.0166 0.0632 *** 0.0158 0.0632 *** 0.0159 0.0631 *** 0.0159 0.0632 *** 0.0158 
STRONG -0.0641 *** 0.0172 -0.0641 *** 0.0193 -0.0641 *** 0.0193 -0.0641 *** 0.0193 -0.0632 *** 0.0191 
Notes: Dependent variable is DEBT, N = 430. Significance levels: *** =0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10. 
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